Matkustajalaivan evakuoinnin mallintaminen matkustajan näkökulmasta by Nevalainen, Jonna
            
 
 
Aalto University 
School of Engineering 
Department of Applied Mechanics 
 
Jonna Nevalainen 
 
Modeling Passenger Ship Evacuation from a Pas-
senger Perspective 
 
Master’s Thesis 
 
Theses submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science in Technology 
 
Espoo, September, 1, 2015 
Supervisor: Professor Pentti Kujala, (Aalto University) 
Thesis advisor(s): Markus Ahola, Master of Arts (Aalto University) 
 
 
 
 
 
Author Jonna Nevalainen  
Title of thesis  Modeling Passenger ship Evacuation from a Passenger Perspective  
Degree programme  Mechanical Engineering 
Major Marine Technology Code K3005 
Thesis supervisor Pentti Kujala 
Thesis advisor(s)  Markus Ahola 
Date  01.09.2015 Number of pages  80 Language  English 
 
Abstract 
 
Current passenger ship evacuation modelling is mostly based on mechanical simulation, 
which tends to ignore passengers as active agents. However, maritime safety doesn’t 
concern only the technical side of ship safety and more attention should be paid to the 
appropriate interaction between environment and people under emergency. This is im- 
portant because, human survival depends on their perception and interpretation of the en- 
vironmental and societal cues. 
Comparing and contrasting the subjective perception of passenger with the physical envi- 
ronment helps us understand the safety environment more comprehensively during an 
accident. Therefore, this study uses passenger ship accident investigation reports to map 
environmental factors, which have an impact on human behaviour under emergency. 
Current research revealed that in emergency people trust more in their own perceptions 
and intuition than given instructions. Human behaviour is guided by instinctual urge to get 
away from the danger, while rational thinking needed in way finding is secondary. Fur- 
thermore, if there’s a lack in safety instructions people tend to follow each other’s, which 
often results crowding in places that should be untrammelled in order to ensure efficient 
evacuation. 
Current evacuation modelling doesn’t consider human-environment interaction in ac- 
ceptable level and given insight to affect of the human cognition on the evacuation pro- 
cess can be used to develop evacuation analysis onwards. 
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Nykyinen evakuiontimallinnus perustuu matemaattiseen mallintamiseen, missä ihminen 
on ympäristössään passiivinen toimija. Tarkastellessamme evakuointiturvallisuutta, hu-
omiota tulisi kiinnittää ihmisen ja ympäristön välisen vuorovaikutuksen sujuvuuteen. Se, 
miten hyvin ja tehokkaasti kykenemme tulkitsemaan ympäristön tarjoamia vihjeitä sekä 
hyödyntämään niitä omassa toiminnassamme,vaikuttavat selviytymiseemme hätätilan-
teessa. 
 
Tutkielmassa kartoitetaan onnettomuusraporteista ihmisen käyttäytymiseen ja toimintaan 
vaikuttaneita ympäristöllisiä ja sosiaalisia tekijöitä. Tarkastelemalla yhteyttä ihmisen 
subjektiivisen käsityksen ja todellisen ympäristön välillä, voimme muodostaa kuvan siitä, 
millä tavalla ihminen kokee ympäristönsä onnettomuustilanteessa.  
 
Tutkimus paljasti, että ihminen luottaa onnettomuustilanteessa omiin vaistoihinsa ja 
havaintoihinsa ympäristöstä. Ihmisen toimintaa ohjaa vaistonvarainen halu päästä turvaan 
ja tässä tilanteessa ihmisen rationaalinen käyttäytyminen on toissijaista. Miehistön opas-
tuksen ja informaation puuttuessa, ihmiset seuraavat toistensa käyttäytymistä ja toimintaa. 
Tämä johtaa usein ruuhkien muodostumiseen paikoissa, jotka turvallisuussyistä tulisi pitää 
vapaina.  
 
Tutkimustulosten perusteella voidaan todeta, ettei nykyinen evakuointimallinnus huomioi 
riittävällä tasolla ihmisen ja ympäristön välistä vuorovaikutusta. Ihminen on 
ympäristössään aktiivinen toimija, jonka kognitiiviset ominaisuudet, kuten havainnointi ja 
päätöksenteon prosessit vaikuttavat evakuointiprosesssiin merkittävästi. Kehittääksemme 
mallinnusta vastaamaan todellista onnettomuustilannetta, ihmisen kognitiiviset 
ominaisuudet tulisi huomioida ja liittää osaksi laivan evakuointimallinnusta. 
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1.Introduction 
 
1.1. Designing for safety in passenger ships  
 
Over the past decade cruises have become ever more popular among vacationers 
when, at the same time, the development of passenger ships has lead to larger ships 
being built, increasing the capacity to thousands of passengers on board. Even 
though still rare, the consequences of a serious accident have now potential to be 
even more disastrous than before. Safety on a large passenger ship is therefore an 
acutely sensitive issue. (Vanem and Skjong, 2005, p. 112) 
 
During its existence the IMO has introduced a series of methods and measures to 
prevent accidents from happening, as well as adopted several regulations to be fol-
lowed in order to minimise the consequences of accidents. Many of the disastrous 
accidents occurred in the past - for instance the capsizing of Herald of Free Enter-
prise in 1987 and later on the sinking of the Estonia in 1994 - have critically sharp-
ened the improvements on the safety regulations for passenger ships. (Vanem and 
Skjong, 2006, p. 112) 
 
The design objectives for safety are defined in the mandatory regulations entitled The 
Guideline for Evacuation Analysis (circ. 1238), approved by Maritime Safety Commit-
tee (MSC) and issued by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The purpose 
of the regulation is to ensure that evacuation performances meet the requirements 
stated in the guidelines, which have been set to a maximum of 60 minutes of evacua-
tion time in total for RORO ships, and 80 minutes for passenger ships. Total evacua-
tion time can be calculated with formulas provided by the IMO and it should also be 
in line with the ship's classification and the ship owner's reguirements (IMO, 2007).  
 
Even though evacuation modelling has evolved during the past decade, unfortunately 
human behaviour has not gone through a similar process (Park et al., 2004). Current 
evacuation modelling is mostly based on simulations of physical phenomena, which 
still tends to ignore passengers as active agents. For instance, it is impossible to dis-
tinguish the route choice of an individual through the modelling process because the 
human way finding process is far more complex than simply choosing the shortest 
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path or the most optimal route, which are used as criteria for the simulation algorithm 
(Golledge,1992). Since the modelling purposes have focused on the quantification of 
human performance in the evacuation, the models are unable to explain why people 
act in a certain way and what are the factors triggering their (sometimes inappropri-
ate) behaviour. In other words, human behaviour is mostly understood and modelled 
by physical quantities such as gender, age or walking speed, rather than considered 
through the cognitive process of a person. These methods thus neglect important 
value in human performance, which is also essential to the assessment of the evac-
uation process.   
1.2. Problem statement and objectives  
 
During an evacuation a person has to overcome several decisions and activities in 
order to survive. How people succeed in an emergency depends on their perception 
and interpretation of social and environmental cues. It is crucial to include human 
perception in the safety design process because it affects the behaviour significantly. 
Furthermore, when there is a comprehensive understanding of how these particular 
features in the ship environment influence the behaviour of passengers, we are able 
to identify critical safety drivers in an emergency (Ahola et al., 2014, p. 230).  
 
This study uses mostly passenger ship accident investigation reports to map envi-
ronmental and social factors affecting human behaviour under an emergency. Com-
paring and contrasting the subjective perception of a passenger with the physical en-
vironment helps us understand safety environment during an accident more compre-
hensively.  
 
The main research question is: "What are the most important factors influencing the 
passengers during evacuation process?" Additional questions are: "What kind of en-
vironmental cues have people used in their decision-making process in an actual 
emergency?" and "How does panic affect information processing and decision-
making in an actual emergency?" And finally, "How can the research outcomes be 
utilised to develop evacuation analysis in the future?"  
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1.3 Study framework 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Study framework  
 
In the framework Human-Environment elements interact with each other. This is de-
scribed as a process of an ongoing action, interaction with the environment or social 
groups, as well as emotions experienced in response to the situation. Human abilities 
are defined as the core element, to which other elements (the environment and social 
groups) acting in the framework are related. Human actions, interaction and emotions 
occur throughout a period of time, involving sequences of inter/action and emotional 
responses whose ultimate purpose is to reach or handle the goal, which is defined by 
the accident event. However, any action or emotional response to accomplish the 
goal depends upon the circumstances and how a person or group perceive and in-
terpret the ongoing situation. The element of environment in the framework repre-
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sents the circumstances and stimuli to human behaviour. This theses does not study 
the crew behaviour, culture, attitudes or knowledge in accident situations and its in-
fluences to passengers as in one element. Therefore, the crew have been screened 
out of scope of the theses framework. However, crew activities as a part of the pro-
cedure is taken into account in the theses. Analysis examines passenger’s behaviour 
and interaction with environment through features of qualitative content analysis and 
literature reviews. The aim of the analysis is to provide answers to research ques-
tions based on what can be deduced from the study outcomes and consider them 
through the design and modelling perspectives.  
 
2. Literature review of evacuation planning 
 
This section provides a review of the fundamentals of evacuation planning and guide-
lines behind it. It describes the evacuation modelling process, modelling parameters, 
especially focusing on parameters on human behaviour during emergency evacua-
tions and gives an example how evacuation is currently simulated. 
2.1 Fundamentals of risk-based design 
 
The ship design process in 90’s relied on prescriptive goal-based way of thinking.  
Goal-based design means that ships are built in accordance to high-level standards, 
rules and regulations to ensure the operational safety of the ship. However, in the 
past decade, the market of cruise industry has been stable in growth. Since 1990, 
over 200 million passengers have taken a cruise (FCCA, 2013). The meet demands 
of the market meant also enlarging ship sizes (FCCA, 2013). Current passenger 
ships carrying up to 8.000 people onboard surely are safety-critical and knowledge-
intensive systems which makes safety indeed a significant design driver (Vassalos et 
al, 2006). In this respect, the regard for human life has continuously increased. The-
se facts challenged the usage of goal-based approach for design purposes.  
 
When changes in design philosophy started in the early 2000s they were linked with 
major accidents having intolerable consequences in respect for human life, environ-
ment and property. Improvements in safety have been driven by accidents thus far. 
For instance, the sinking of Estonia (1994) inspired improvements in the safety regu-
lations for passenger ships but accidents like that also emphasised that accidents at 
sea happen often as a result of human error (Cacciabue, 2004). In goal-based ap-
 7 
proach safety was considered merely through technical analysis, which was not seen 
as a proper and holistic way to improve safety (Wang, 2001). In order to override 
problems within the goal-based design philosophy, it was replaced by risk-based 
methodology with an advanced view of integrating safety cost-effectively within the 
design process (Vassalos, 2006). 
 
Risk-based design is a formalised design methodology including formal risk assess-
ment framework that facilitates the system integration of risk analysis in the design 
process with prevention or reduction of risk treated as a design objective (Vassalos, 
2006). Safety awareness has come to the forefront and it is seen as an integrated 
part of the design process rather than considered isolated or fixed by add-on (Pa-
panikolaou, 2009; Vassalos, 2006). In practice, it offers freedom to the designer in 
the early state of the process to choose an optimal solution for meeting safety objec-
tives. However, decisions made within the process are always reflected with costs, 
whereby safety investment is targeted to achieve the greatest benefit and perfor-
mance with proactive manners to guarantee complete regulatory requirements re-
sponding to the severity of risks (Lois et al., 2004; Vassalos, 2006). A successfully 
achieved design objective of risk-based assessment is a comprehensive and numeri-
cally efficient risk-cost model depicting knowledge of integrated ship systems and 
their relation to prioritised risks, consequences and risk control options.   
2.2 Evacuation modelling process 
 
Evacuation is the protective action used in cases of ship emergencies and it can be 
seen as the withdrawal action of people from a specific area because of a real risk. 
An essential element of ship evacuation plan is a well-defined layout plan where ac-
curate preplanning adds to the effectiveness of the evacuation process. Evacuation 
in case of any critical ship risk scenarios result in drastic movement inside the ship 
and in the demand over the ship's evacuation system. Therefore, the time used to 
complete the evacuation has critical importance and especially affects the success of 
the emergency evacuation. In emergency circumstances the overall objective is to 
muster the passengers as quickly as possible and any lack of ability in unequivocal 
decision-making process could lead to delays in abandoning the ship. Failure of 
evacuating people in time will be fatal and the time spent escaping the ship will be 
crucial. (Vanem and Skjong, 2006). 
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Today, the objective of evacuation planning is to identify not only the best but also 
the shortest evacuation routes and provide estimates of time needed to evacuate the 
people onboard.  Evacuation time estimates due to different risk scenarios provide 
sufficient warning to the crew (or master) and reduce people’s exposure to the risk. 
Analysing the risk scenarios provides the knowledge needed to reach a balance be-
tween risk and time awareness, given the last possible time for orders to evacuate 
and to avoid evacuation without people losing their lives.  
 
The effectiveness of an evacuation process is measured by the estimated time for 
evacuation. It is defined as the time required to evacuate people from the risk sphere 
of influence. An evacuation model is a system to simulate and evaluate the effect of 
evacuation parameters. Because evacuation is mainly dependent on the behaviour of 
individuals, evacuation parameters are those which describe the physical behaviour 
of an evacuated individual in case of an emergency. (Hongtae et al., 2004). 
2.3 Human behaviour parameters  
 
Prior studies (Galea et al., 2011; Ha et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2003; Park et al., 2004; 
Vassalos et al., 2002) have shown that predicting human behaviour during the evac-
uation is very complicated. This is mainly because quantifying parameters for model-
ling purposes is challenging since many physical and psychological factors vary due 
to different types of accidents and environments. Consequently, human behaviour is 
evaluated in the evacuation analysis based on velocity only (Ha et al. 2012). The val-
id parameters are presented in the guidelines on evacuation analysis for new and ex-
isting passenger ships, IMO/MSC Circ.1238 approved in 2007. It should be noticed, 
that the aim of the guideline is to provide approximation of the ship's total evacuation 
performance rather than to model an actual emergency (IMO,2007). Since interests 
are solely directed towards identification of bottlenecks and assessment of the ship 
layout, developing an alternative chain of events in the emergency would increase 
the knowledge of how different choices influence the escape route efficiency and to-
tal performance.  
 
However, guidelines suggest two distinct methodologies for evaluation purposes. In 
the guideline, a simplified method is obligatory and used as a first stage analysis. In 
this case, human behaviour is modelled only on a group level. Accordingly, method 
utilises predefined individual data of walking speeds on stairs and corridors which are 
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derived from civil building experience. At the method, total evacuation time is quanti-
fied as a flow time. It is based on a calculation of flow of people via escape routes 
from corridors and staircase either/or doors or public spaces. Flow time calculation is 
repeated for every space on the ship and the total evacuation time is defined by the 
flow times added with specific predefined congestion and counterflow factors. Fur-
thermore, total time of evacuation is calculated separately for both day and night 
cases. (IMO, 2007). 
 
Another method introduced in the guideline is an advanced evacuation analysis. 
However, verification of simulation tool as well as validation of parameters are still on 
process and for this reason the advanced evacuation methodology is not totally 
ready for use (Galea, et al., 2013; IMO, 2007). The model proposes a set of parame-
ters which specify a person’s physical abilities on a more detailed level. These pa-
rameters are categorised into four; environmental, geometrical, procedural and popu-
lation (Vanem and Skjong, 2006).  
 
In short, the environmental category describes static and dynamic condition of the 
ship but assessment of listing effect is still uncompleted (IMO, 2007). More reliable 
data need to be gathered before these parameters can be used for modelling pur-
poses.  
 
The difference between static and dynamic conditions is defined by sea environmen-
tal and ship operational conditions. Intact conditions are understood as a static condi-
tions which means that ship is in normal operational configuration. In contrast, ship 
dynamic conditions are related to ship damage conditions. For damaged conditions 
are affected by risk scenario and behaviour of the sea. Flooding increase the heeling 
angle and decrease stability of ship. Together with the external environmental factors 
it cause the ship heel at an angle. In methodology heeling angle and its dynamic na-
ture are not taken into account and thus intact and damaged conditions have not 
been differentiated from each other yet (Ginnis et al., 2010; IMO, 2007). Considering 
passengers, listing decrease humans pedestrian in inclined plane and further availa-
bility of some designed evacuation routes might not be in use because of listing. 
These factors together emphasize the necessity to facilitate way finding in complex 
environment.   
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Procedural category in turn recommends four scenario cases to be modelled instead 
of two (night/day). Added evacuation cases consider longest possible evacuation 
time during night and day time (IMO, 2007). However, for example, crew guidance 
under emergency is not suggested to be considered in any manner. Population is the 
only category containing detailed data from speeds and response time. It presents a 
composition of individual walking speeds consisting of a wider range of values re-
garding gender and age (IMO, 2007).  
 
The model itself is based on dynamic movement of pedestrians. Equation is adopted 
from the model of social force, which measures each of individual’s internal motiva-
tions to perform in a certain situation. The model produces a detailed data of interac-
tion, crowd and counterflow-avoiding behaviour.  
 
Ha et al. (2012) tested social force model in a ship environment by using a cellular 
automata model (CA). CA is a two-dimensional simulation tool, in which every agent 
occupies one grid at the beginning and then by using a rule-based algorithm moves 
from one grid to another toward the preferred direction (exit) with desired velocity. 
The movement of each individual is recorded. The tool is used especially when ex-
amining the exit dynamic in a passenger evacuation case.  
 
The social force model was tested in different evacuation scenarios (day, night) and 
spaces (cabin, corridor) in order to verify the proposed model but also to make sure 
that software components worked as planned. Test results were confirmed by com-
paring those with requirements of total evacuation time by IMO. In case of RORO 
passenger ship with total number of 1892 persons onboard test result was satisfacto-
ry, 37 minutes 50 seconds in total which is less than the required 60 minutes. (Ha et 
al., 2012).  However, despite the fact that the total evacuation time was under the 
maximum requirement, it is difficult to make comparisons with corresponding acci-
dents that occurred in the past, because there are no post-stage evacuation analysis 
about total evacuation times in such cases. But when reflecting the CA model results 
to these real-life accidents, the evacuation time usually differs quite a lot. For exam-
ple, in case of RORO passenger ship Sally Albatross grounding incident in 1994 in 
the Gulf of Finland an orderly evacuation of 1550 people took 2 hours 20 minutes 
(Sally Albatross Accident Investigation Report). Reflection indicates that perhaps us-
ing only a mechanist simulation is not accurate enough to evaluate evacuation time. 
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Counter flow is also simulated by the CA. This shows that the total evacuation time 
increases with relative increase in the number of persons in the room (Ha et al., 
2012). Helbing et al. (2000) have simulated crowd dynamic similarly but for building 
environment purposes and concluded that individual movement to counter direction 
has an obstructing influence which at its worst can trigger panic in the crowd. For this 
reason, it would be necessary to prevent counter flow entirely. In reality, prevention is 
perhaps impossible, because people have a tendency to behave similarly to people 
surrounding them. Affecting people’s behaviour by offering environmental anchor 
points, way finding in complex or unfamiliar environment will likely decrease way find-
ing errors and chaos among people (Colledge,1992). In addition, in the evacuation 
models are missing puzzle of escape behaviour where the speed of movement is di-
rected down stairways in a threatening situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Simulation of counter flow (Ha et al.,2012) 
 
To summarise the guideline methodologies, the simplified method is easy to use but 
contains weaknesses, because it consider identical characteristics for all passengers, 
which reduce the quality of the method. Furthermore, in the simplified analysis, hu-
man response to emergency alarm sound is considered and determined collectively 
only.  
 
Based on scenario setting response times are 5 minutes during the day time and 10 
minutes at night. However, the advanced method brings up response time as one pa-
rameter in the evacuation analysis. Response time reflects the time spent in the pre-
evacuation phase. As opposed to the advanced method, simplified analysis does not 
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consider the dynamic flow of population with crowd behaviour and interaction. Fur-
thermore, the ship motion has not yet been taken into account in either methods.  
(IMO 2007).  
2.4 Human behaviour data collection from full-scale trials at sea 
 
One way of collecting human related data about response times is by conducting 
empirical exercises. In maritime industry, the main purpose of data collection is to 
implement acceptable criteria for response and assembly time in an emergency in 
order to test and validate ship evacuation models.  It has been stated that collection 
and characterisation of human performance data facilitates understanding of people's 
behaviour in an emergency and fills the lack of comprehensive data regarding human 
response times with a sufficient collection size.  Data has been collected during the 
past few years with the help of three sea trials onboard of cruise ship and ROPAX 
ship at sea (figure 3 and 4). Experiment design differentiated from previous trials, be-
cause before trials were conducted in the port. For the experiment two different ship 
types were used for generating diversity to passenger response activities. (Galea et 
al., 2011; 2013). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3 Jewels of the Sea, Royal Caribbean Cruise Line (Cruise ship) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Olympia Palace, Minoan Lines (ROPAX) 
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Trials consist of three types of data settings. First, passengers' response time is col-
lected by using video cameras. Cameras are positioned throughout the ships to rec-
ord passengers' response time and activities during that time. This phase also in-
cluded information and action tasks completed in response phase. Second type of 
data comprised of assembly time for evacuation model validation purposes. In the 
trial each of individuals' paths were tracked from their initial location to the assembly 
station. This was based on the usage of IR tagged system. This method provided de-
tails of the escape routes taken by individual passengers but also the average speed 
and population densities in certain areas. The third data collecting method consists of 
a questionnaire filled out by each passenger participating to the trials (Galea et al., 
2011). However, the results of questionnaires were not presented in articles, thus it 
was not clear what the questionnaires were for and what kind of role the answers had 
for the analysis of response time and the final results.  
These semi-unannounced trials followed the process of evacuation procedure and 
thus were carried out in ideal conditions. Passengers were informed that the experi-
ment may take a place during their cruise however, the exact time was unspecified. 
The trial started by the ship Master sounding the alarm in the morning, after which 
the crew was guiding the passengers into the designated assembly areas. Passen-
gers had their assembly points indicated in their keycards. The end of trial was de-
termined by the Master and the trials were usually completed within 10-12 minutes 
until the most of the passengers were assembled. (Galea,et al., 2013).  
In the trials the onset of stimulus was presented in audio and the response times and 
activities involved were analysed by video footage. When measuring response time 
in trials it is generally assumed that people's responses to auditory stimulus spread 
out in time. In functional sense, conditions were generated on a basis of explicit in-
structions. 
The results of the experiments were presented dividing the data setting in distribu-
tions of response time and assemble time. Simulation of the validation data was con-
ducted by maritimeEXODUS software. The software suits for determining the perfor-
mance of passengers as well as crew under emergency with variety of scenarios. 
The model is advanced and has several different unique abilities but especially due 
to time, simulation outputs are able to e.g. predict time frames required to assemble 
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or for individuals or groups to perform specific tasks as a part of a given scenario. 
(Deere et al.,2009).  
Each response time setting in a specific area was fitted in the log normal curve and 
further constructed in overall distribution of response time. The response times of 
1228 passengers in the cruise ship trial were determined as follows: the passengers' 
overall response time distribution with key parameters were minimum of 0 seconds 
and maximum of 1379 seconds, whereas the log of the mean response time is at 
5.012 seconds with standard deviation 0.89. (Galea et al., 2013 p.162).  
In ROPAX ship trial, response times were determined in regional spaces of the ship's 
public places (Galea et al. 2013, p.160) and similarly to the cruise ship trial the start-
ing regions of passengers were known. Response time distribution was determined 
for each region separately, because some of the passengers did not want to be 
tagged, but still participated in the experiment. However, the response time distribu-
tion for passengers in the bar region was a the minimum of 0 seconds and maximum 
of 402 seconds whereas the log of mean value was 3.432 seconds with standard de-
viation 0.924 (Data for day 2 trial) (Galea et al., 2013, p.161).  
Recommendations to improve the response time distribution from current guidelines 
have been generated by distributions from new data collection. Current guidelines 
consist of two alternatives; day and night case response time distributions, which are 
suggested to be 300 seconds (5 minutes) in the day time and 700 seconds (10 
minutes) at night. On the basis of results from the trials, ROPAX and cruise ship re-
sponse time distributions are proposed to be presented separately. In order to gen-
erate a more representative and robust distribution ROPAX trials results at sea could 
be combined with existing day case response time distributions (generated trials in 
port). Being statistically almost identical, the current day case guidelines could also 
represent ROPAX response time distribution in the future. Since there is no appropri-
ate data available, night cases should remain unaltered for now. (Brown et al., 2012).     
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Figure 5 Suggested new IMO day case for cruise ships (Brown et al., 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Suggested new IMO night case for cruise ship (Brown et al., 2012)     
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Figure 7 Suggested new IMO day case for ROPAX ((Brown et al., 2012)     
 
Since it is suggested that the guidelines are modified to separate ROPAX and cruise 
ships, the proposed new response time distribution for day cases on cruise ships is 
generated from public areas on the ship. Similarly to the current IMO day case re-
sponse time distribution is truncated at 300 seconds. Response times for night time 
cases are derived from trials on cruise ships' cabins area. To represent considerably 
more reliable response time distribution for night time, the tail extends to 1100 se-
conds and it is shifted by 400 seconds to account for the assumption that passengers 
are sleeping. (Brown et al., 2012). 
The objective is to go towards realism in the experiments (Galea et al., 2013). How-
ever, the generated distributions of response times represent a functionally and op-
erationally intact ship in the day time. Furthermore, the passengers' response time 
cannot be disassociated from the human cognitive processes - such as attention or 
perception which are related to human reactions - and limit the study to the time 
scales alone. The lack of realistic conditions in experiments causes missed respons-
es, because they are not representative of actual accident conditions.    
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2.5 Simulation models and tools for evacuation analysis 
 
Evacuation analysis covers the probability of risk occurrence and the expected con-
sequences in each scenario. The evacuation simulation used together with risk as-
sessment provides an estimation of the consequences related to specific situation. In 
its simplest, simulation usually indicates the expected numbers of fatalities for each 
defined scenario. Utilising risk-based tools offers an ability to address any accident 
scenario to facilitate a systematic risk prevention/reduction by any passive (design) 
or active (operation) means, thus effectively containing risk (Vassalos, 2006). How-
ever, this kind of perspective ignores the evacuation effectiveness in case the pre-
vention of the risk fails. 
 
Human behaviour and computer simulation are two topics of particular interest in 
emergency evacuation modelling. From the beginning, evacuation simulation is play-
ing an important role in the iterative design process. However, using simulation as a 
post-evacuation stage analysis to analyse evacuation system in cases of accidents 
would likely improve the evacuation process further. Simulation tool assists the de-
signers in evacuation planning and provides information about evacuation parame-
ters to support the performance of evacuation. In addition, simulation as a training 
tool could offer support to decision making process and operative functionality of the 
crew.   
 
Simulation models are based on algorithms that handle both the dynamics of the 
population and the physical behaviour of an individual. Evacuation simulation models 
are divided into three different levels according to their scales. (1) In microscopic 
models, movement is described on the level of individuals and their interaction with 
each other or the environment. The behaviour of any single person is modelled indi-
vidually. It enables to understand one part of the evacuation system on a more de-
tailed level, because individual behaviour is captured in some set of rules of behav-
iour. (2) Macroscopic simulation is the flow model, where evacuation dynamic is 
based on the similarities of gas-kinetic continuum flow model. Evacuees' movements 
are calculated by using supplemented data in conjunction with speed-density rela-
tionship. (3) A third level of simulation model is the mesoscopic model, a combination 
of aforementioned models. It fills the gap between individual interaction of the micro-
scopic approach and the larger level of macroscopic simulation. (Lee et al., 2003).  
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Developments around the simulation models have generated several similar soft-
wares for evacuation analysis purposes. There are approximately 20 different evacu-
ation models available. Different software packages utilise different methods for cal-
culations, this is much dependent on model scale. Maritime EXODUS, EVI software 
or cellular automata model are all developed for evacuation simulation and pedestri-
an analysis purposes. First of these simulation tools in use was EVI. ( Deere et al., 
2009; Vassalos et al., 2002). 
 
Code-name EVI means passenger evacuation performance capability specialised in 
evacuation at sea, and the abbreviation is derived from the term evacuabilty. EVI is a 
commercial simulation tool developed by SSRC (The evacuation simulation Group of 
the ship stability Research Center, University of Strathclyde, UK) in collaboration with 
Deltamarin Ltd. This multi-agent mesoscopic model works in 3D environment and 
thus provides a multi-level planning capacity. The model consists of a number of es-
cape and rescue scenarios with a range of hazards whilst accounting for ship dynam-
ic motions in a sea environment. However, this beneficial property is only considered 
in the simulation model and has not been adopted into the guidelines. Weakness of 
multi-agent model is the absence of any obstacles and fellow evacuees, which 
means that every agent will flow towards the evacuation direction without any colli-
sion with neighbouring agents or space obstacles along the way. This means that the 
agents are dummies without any defined characteristics of an individual. In a real sit-
uation avoiding contacts with other evacuees is nearly impossible. For example, the 
behaviour of a large number of people trying to escape from a fire through a narrow 
corridor is surely affected by the toxic gases, smoke, physical obstacles, and etcete-
ra. It should also be scrutinised if and how much a person falling down in this situa-
tion affects other people and their progress, time and flow (increasing the time and 
decreasing the flow). (Vassalos et al., 2002).  
  
For summarising key factors from the chapter, today's ship design process relies on 
risk-based design which integrates risks to traditional design process producing de-
sign solution that meet safety performance cost effectively. Proactive perception to 
accident preparedness includes minimising the consequences of risks as a part of 
the design process. The purpose of evacuation planning is to find efficient design so-
lutions for ship evacuation, passengers' exposure to risks and further. Predicting ship 
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evacuation performance is modelled by the efficiency of human behaviour and the 
escape arrangements.  
 
In the past decade human evacuation performance has focused on tuning human 
physical abilities for simulation models in order to improve the safety of evacuation 
performances further. Sea trials, for instance, are a novel experiment type for collect-
ing human related data. However, the perspective is moreover quantitative and snips 
off the larger context of human behaviour. Simulation relies on mathematical model-
ling of human behaviour, ignoring that human behaviour is linked to a larger context 
of cognitive system. For instance, psychological aspects in human behaviour are still 
extracted from evacuation modelling. 
 
3. Literature review of evacuation planning 
 
 
Theoretical approach provides insight to the relationship between human-
environment iteraction. This chapter reviews factors interfering the compatibility of 
human and environment interface and on the other hand highlights what sort of envi-
ronment would support basic cognitive processes. In addition, panic and time pres-
sure, which are related to highly stressful conditions are taken into account for this 
compatibility of human mental processes and the environment. Linking this approach 
to ship environment and human performance in accidents aims to facilitate aware-
ness and understanding about the passengers' efforts to function during an evacua-
tion in this specific environment.  
3.1 Introduction to perspective of human behaviour 
 
As a part of human nature and demands of the existing world, individuals are born to 
perform. Hence, performance has a central role in the lives of many of us. Performing 
successfully means that one is engaged in a goal-directed activity. Individual's urge 
to perform in a purposive manner is seen as a key driver for achieved goals success-
fully (Matthews et al., 2000). However, the behaviour within one’s performance is re-
lated to the environment. Research of the congruence of behaviour in environment 
relies on the action required by situational demands that underlie predictability of be-
haviour (Kaplan,1983). It is found that for the most part human behaviour is predicta-
ble. This perspective emphasises fitting the person into the environment. It could be 
argued that the human behaviour is predictable also in accidents or predictably un-
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predictable instead. Another perspective of interface is the purposive action an indi-
vidual attempts to carry out in given situation. This comparably fits the environment to 
a person. This kind of optimisation of the behaviour-environment interface, where a 
person's behaviour becomes a central concern is a key element in research 
(Kaplan,1983).      
 
Environmental psychology is a field studying interaction between human and envi-
ronment. This interaction produces a circle of closed feedback system, where indi-
viduals change the  physical environment, which then as a result affects their behav-
iour. It is called a molar environment (Baum,1989). Thus, environmental psychology 
is not sufficient when focusing on understanding individual’s intrapsychic processes 
such as perception or emotions in reaction to the stimuli impinging one in a specific 
situation; the goals are rather directed towards molar environment (Gärling,1998). 
Furthermore, as opposed to environmental psychology, cognitive psychology is seek-
ing to understand individual's real-life behaviour and the psychological processes of 
a person in any given situation, thus it emphasises also the failure or even break-
down of human performance (Matthews et al., 2000).  
 
However, the compatibility of human-environment interface model and the cognitive 
perspective of human behaviour are linked together with a common factor which is 
information processing. Creating suitable environment for people, the model high-
lights information processing as a starting point of human effort for functioning in the 
physical environment. Incompatibilities interfere the relationship of person and envi-
ronment and thus one might not experience environment as supportive 
(Kaplan,1983). Further, in discipline of cognitive psychology the success of perfor-
mance depends on information processing (Matthews et al., 2000). Interference in 
human information processing affects judgment and activities. In this perspective 
human performance is significantly influenced by stress factor. Under stable condi-
tions stress is caused by e.g. heat, fatigue or a noisy environment (Matthews et al., 
2000). The presence of stress is very typical in uncertain situations. In physical 
sense, stress in nonspecific response of the body to noxious stimuli (Choo,1995 
p.613). Conceptualising the definition of stress, it can be specified through three dif-
ferent perspectives; stress can refer to the response of a person placed in a chal-
lenging or threatening environment. According to another perspective stress is de-
fined by the changes provoked in the person. The third view considers stress through 
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the transactional model, which is connected to a widely used definition of stress pro-
vided by Lazarus and Folkman (1984 p.19) Psychological stress is a particular rela-
tionship between the person and environment that is appraised by the person as tax-
ing or exceeding his or her well-being.  
 
This highlights the nature of the misfit between the individual and environment (Choo, 
1995 p.613). Furthermore, individuals differ in their ability to handle stress and moti-
vations when called upon stress.  
 
In addition, performance psychology stems from cognitive psychology and is related 
to the quality of behaviour by examining factors such as speed and accuracy of re-
sponse. Furthermore, testing a model against empirical data is habitual in the field. 
For instance, the measuring of reaction times or revealing errors in the performance 
represent themes of performance psychology testing. However, understanding the 
set of factors that control reaction times requires extensive understanding of cogni-
tive modes of response (Matthews et al., 2000). The factors affected can be distin-
guished as competence, which is the capacity of the mind to perform tasks, while 
performance refers to what the mind does compute in the situation. It may fall short, if 
competence of person is interfered by various factors affecting the mind and causing 
for instance stress. Summarising, all perspectives are needed when creating and 
achieving a successful understanding of the relationship between human-
environment connection, especially in complex and closed ship environment.  
3.2 Human cognitive process 
 
In this section the human mental activities are explained on a theoretical level in or-
der to reach a basic understanding of the processes of human behaviour in any envi-
ronment. Later on behaviour is discussed in detailed by the means of incompatibili-
ties disturbing the human-environment relationship and linked in the ship environ-
ment and passengers functioning in the environment.  
 
In an article about human-environment interaction Kaplan (1983) applies a basic 
model of sources and types of cognitive processes affecting the relationship between 
behaviour and the environment (Figure 8). The quality of human-environment interac-
tion depends a lot on information patterns that make up the environment 
(Kaplan,1983). Human information processing continuously interprets available in-
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formation to maintain a good understanding about present situation surroundings 
(Shager, 2008). Perception of the surrounding environment is organised in mental 
maps which are serving and supporting an individual's perceptual processes. This 
particular model emphasises the relations of actions and plan concepts of human 
mental activities within an environment. In the model, sources of mental activities are 
divided in external and internal information that correspond further with the mental 
activities, which in turn are distinguished as images and plans/actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Sources and types of cognitive processes (Kaplan, 1983)  
 
In the model environmental perception and knowledge is derived from information of 
external environment, just as much as the required actions. Plans are presented in 
the model to be a cognitive component for actions considered and taken. Thus, it 
plays a central role in human-environment compatibility. 
 
Similarly, an individual's knowledge or expectations of the external world have their 
own place in the mental process. Individual’s perceptual world has a role to be a fa-
cilitator or even functioning as enabler when carrying out one’s plan. Reflection 
means that individuals pull together a broad range of previous knowledge in order to 
make a better sense of it for another purpose and anticipated possibilities in the fu-
ture. Especially, outward and vigilant reflection has an important supportive role in 
human mental processes if one has to face uncertainty. Individual reflection in a safe 
place can have a protective and supportive meaning and actions required in emer-
gency could be far more effective.  
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Legible environment supports individual intentions to be favourable for carrying out 
almost all sorts of purposive plans and actions. On the opposite, distraction and illeg-
ible environment tends to undermine any kind of activity (Kaplan, 1983). The problem 
of illegible environment lies as much on how the environment is remembered or an-
ticipated as on how it is perceived (Kaplan, 1983).  
3.3 Human information processing 
 
Human information processing can be described in terms of a number of stages in 
which the information is transformed and transmitted. In its simplest, information pro-
cessing can be described as a process where information is received through senses 
(figure 9). For instance, sight, hearing and smelling are designed to be sensory re-
ceptors recognising external stimuli from the environment, further transforming the 
information into an internal representation and then being transmitted in the response 
(Shager, 2008). In addition, the form in which information is presented can change 
during the situation.  
 
 
 
Figure 9  Human information process 
 
Information processing is fundamentally important in human performance, because 
of the representation of information; judgments, decisions and choices made on the 
basis of the represented information. 
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Incompatibilities arise largely from the lack of what one requires from the environ-
ment. Often focus is targeted on what is absent in the environment rather than what 
is present. Incompatibilities can be caused by stimulation where the presence of 
stimuli in the perceived environment can cause distractions. Typical example is ina-
dequate or lacking information which creates difficulties for action made necessary 
by environmental pressure (Kaplan, 1983). In addition, when environment is system-
atically unresponsive it fails to provide information, for example, for way finding in the 
environment, it also is likely to complicate one’s purposive activities. Perception and 
knowledge from the environment can be used to form an action plan, in other words, 
cognitive maps, which connect the human internal information processing to actual 
behaviour. Maps are suggested to support purposive course of actions and minimise 
efforts to reach destinations or goals (Chen and Stanney, 1999). In case that one 
does not get any responses from the environment, the corrosive incompatibility by 
environment is called helplessness (Kaplan, 1983). Uncontrollable environmental 
stressors such as noise or crowding might expose a person to helplessness (Evans 
and Stecker, 2004).  
 
Information processing depends on a variety of factors which are not part of the cur-
rent models. Basically all existing models used for evacuation modelling purposes 
and have basis on the physical science model, similarly to fire safety models in build-
ing fires, do not recognise the information processing and variation of information 
representation (Pires, 2005). The models are rather generic and for instance, do not 
take information processing and decision-making under consideration in the very be-
ginning of the emergency. In other words, simulation models are not modelling the 
time when people become aware of a threat such as fire and do not take into account 
the time needed for information processing in order to decide further action - usually 
movement towards a safe place and deciding on route choices, possibly even the 
changing the route along the way. Modelling the way finding process as a hierar-
chical decision process (Løvås,1998) or emphasising the natural selection of way 
finding may not be so obvious in design principles. 
Simulation as a part of design process among ship designers is assessing potential 
escape alternatives within the ship layout. In addition, escape behaviour is studied by 
using physical factors, such as speed of movement in the different spaces, while ig-
noring psychological factors in the physical models. Even though the models have 
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extended the possibilities in engineering design and computer modelling works as 
significant value bringing synergy in many ways to designing and planning, it also 
has a limited sense regarding human cognition, including models used in ship design 
(see chapters 2.4 and 2.5) e.g. EVI, maritimeEXODUS.   
The model must incorporate a way to simulate people's behaviour. The simulation 
must be based on what information is really available in the environment and not 
what is assumed to be available (Pires, 2005). For instance, evacuation procedure in 
ship environment rely much on information and guidance coming from the crew. De-
mands of purposive action taken in the situation emphasise person-to-person rela-
tionship which results in making the passenger a very passive actor regarding the 
environment. What happens when information is not received from the crew at all? 
Then the environment has a key role to provide an answer regarding the spatial cog-
nitive processing for supporting human activities. In addition, understanding interac-
tion between two people is significant also because cultural diversity is growing in the 
global cruise market. Thus conditions are not short-lived but rather continuous phe-
nomena. The cultural differences surely have an effect on how information is pre-
sented, because cultural habits are dictating individuals' way of thinking, behaving 
and communicating (Oliveira, 2007). The effectiveness of such interaction is deter-
mined by mutual understanding between the guide and the guided in this specific sit-
uation but also in extended context.  
Evacuation models are programs run by external agents. However, people pursue 
goals actively and flexibly within complex environments. The computers suggest hu-
man cognition to be unduly passive (Matthews et al. 2010). This is caused by differ-
ences in the function of computer operation and operation of human brain. Where the 
computer's operational functions are covered to abide by rule-covered logic, human 
do this poorly. Humans instead are able to form generalisations, make inferences 
and understand complex patterns and further, have emotions. Computer processing 
is not able to cover this behind processes (Matthews et al., 2010). However, comput-
er simulation should not be abandoned, especially in those fields that are linked to 
real-world performance. There internal information processing would be seen as a 
part of a wider cycle of interface of person-environment and further bringing benefits 
for modelling objectives (Matthews et al., 2010).  
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3.4 Human decision-making under uncertain conditions 
 
In its simplest, decision making is a continuous cognitive process in which a person 
is identifying and choosing a course of action based on the alternatives one has in 
the situation. In cognitive perspective, the decision-making process is integrated with 
interaction with the environment. Decision is a response resulting always in a final 
choice which may or may not lead to action. However, for the final choice mind ap-
plies logic, statistics or heuristics.  Each of these mental frameworks are suited to a 
particular kind of problem. Rules of logic and statistics are linked to rational reason-
ing while heuristics involve error-prone intuitions or irrationality (Gigerenzer and 
Gaissmaier, 2011).  
 
Research on judgment and decision-making has identified important limitations in 
cognitive and, more recently, emotional processing. The message of decisions errors 
and biases may have widespread effects. In addition, considering physical science 
models, emotional effects are not include in any way in the modelling parameters. 
Sime, (1983) argues that since modelling handles humans as non-thinking objects it 
may lead to wrong predictions or failure of design solutions.  
 
Many areas of human knowledge are researched in several decision-making theo-
ries. Descriptive theory focuses on the how of individual decision making, while ra-
tional and normative theories investigate how a person should decide. Culture is 
suggested to have a  major influence on the preferences of life and thus affect on 
how people think, behave and what they believe in. Furthermore, culture works as a 
simplifying mechanism facilitating people to process information and interpret the sur-
rounding environment (Oliveira, 2007). Rational theory of decision-making has been 
defined as the compatibility between a  choice and value, which tends to highlight 
weighting mechanism between these two factors. In rational behaviour, the optimisa-
tion of outcomes is focused on the process of choosing rather than what is chosen. 
Therefore, it emphasises how decision makers analyse a number of outcomes in or-
der to select the final choice. Furthermore, chosen alternative is always expected to 
have greater value than other potential choices. (Oliveira, 2007). 
 
However, people rarely adhere to logical models of choice in their decisions, because 
rationality would require knowledge of all the relevant alternatives, their consequenc-
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es and probabilities. The world around should be predictable without surprises and in 
reality, such conditions can rarely be met  (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). More-
over, deviations from rational behaviour might not always even be explained by any 
theories of decision-making. Suggestions as to why people's behaviour deviates from 
rationality may be found in the individual’s set of beliefs, culture or/and incomplete 
information processing (Oliveira, 2007). In addition, the knowledge of emotion influ-
encing judgments and decisions have increased across disciplines (Lerner et al., 
2015). 
 
Decisions have an effect on how people behave and solve problems. Decisions and 
behaviour can be determined as the main elements of the decision-making phenom-
ena which involves information processing and reacting to stimuli from the external 
world. Passengers as decision makers in the uncertain environment are continuously 
making  decisions affecting their physical safety and mental health. Decision-making 
situations are often coloured with emotions. Furthermore, decisions are likely made 
under time pressure, because evacuation is a time critical event. Simply, the nature 
of decision making differs from conditions where future is certain and the optimal so-
lution to a problem can be determined. In uncertain conditions it can no longer be as-
sumed that rational models of behaviour would automatically provide a proper ans-
wer to the situation (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). Therefore, it is important to 
recognise the factors present in the uncertain conditions and examine how those are 
linked to the decision-making process. Furthermore, recognising the drivers and their 
consequences may facilitate predicting an individual or a group's behaviour under 
uncertain conditions. In uncertain situations unwanted effects are likely to arise in the 
decision-making and reduce the capacity of the decision making process.  
 
The first factor that has value on decision-making is emotions. Emotion has a crucial 
influence on decisions and the outcomes of a decision correspondingly have an ef-
fect on emotions (Lerner et al., 2015). Emotions in the decision-making are defined 
as multifaceted, biologically mediated and concomitant reactions relating to survival-
relevant events. Emotions have a tendency of being dominant drivers in most mean-
ingful decisions in life.  
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Indeed, positive feelings are likely to increase and facilitate problem solving and inte-
gration of information (Meller et al, 1998). Vice versa, negative feelings may influence 
negatively on the decision-making process. 
Loewenstein et al. (2001), divide emotions into anticipated and anticipatory emotions. 
Anticipatory emotions are the immediate reaction to risks or uncertainties indicating 
extreme negative feelings such fear and dread. Contrarily, anticipated emotions are 
typically those which are expected to be experienced in the future. Individuals are 
motivated to avoid such emotions as disappointment and regret and thus decisions 
are targeted to minimise the likelihood of negative anticipated emotions. However, 
these emotions are taken into account when determining the utility and expected out-
comes of decisions and courses of action (Schwarz, 2000). The models that focus on 
the anticipatory emotions are more relevant in the evacuation point of view as the 
presence of feelings influence decision-making in that time.  
Prior models emphasise a valence approach to emotions focusing on positive versus 
negative states of feelings extending the feelings-as-information approach. Models 
compared the perception of two negative emotions, fear and anger, and propose how 
these emotions affect judgment of risks. It has been found that fearful individuals 
make pessimistic judgments about future events, whilst angry individuals make opti-
mistic judgments (Lerner et al., 2015; Schwarz, 2000). In addition, the feelings-as-
information theory conceptualises the role of subjective experiences (Schwarz, 2000) 
and highlights anticipatory emotions in judgment (Loewenstein et al., 2001).  
 
Models assume that people use their feelings as a source of information following the 
same principles as with the use of any other information available (Schwarz, 2010). 
Furthermore, emotional reaction often has a dominating role on behaviour (Loewen-
stein et al., 2001). Serving as a basis for judgments, feelings inform people about the 
nature of a current situation and thinking processes are tuned to meet the situational 
requirements. However, people do not rely on their feelings when they attribute them 
to another source. Moreover, it could be undermining their informational value for the 
task at hand (Schwarz, 2010). 
 
Second factor involved in decision-making is the time pressure experienced under 
uncertain conditions. Furthermore, stress is typically related to time critical events. 
There are various situations where people are pressed to make decisions by dead-
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lines. Information processing can decrease in the time available for processing, con-
sequently increasing the information load and putting pressure on the decision task 
at hand. (Ozel, 2001).  
 
Ozel, (2001) states that human behaviour during a fire can be described as episodic, 
where individuals in fire perform a variety of action sequences. Each of the episodes 
have a goal and a number of actions are linked with these goals. Similarly, ship 
evacuation is episodic by nature, where the ultimate goal is directed to be rescued 
from assembly stations to somewhere safe. Episodes can be described as a se-
quence of decisions and actions, each of them being equally important. For instance, 
the decision of selecting an exit requires that an exit needs to be selected for exiting 
(Ozel, 2001).  
 
However, time pressure can influence identifying relevant cues from the environment 
when selecting an exit or escape route. Individuals tend to screen out essential envi-
ronmental cues (Tversky,1977) which otherwise or in another situation would provide 
guidance. In the complex environment, salient number of stimuli from the environ-
ment can form a distraction to information processing and further activities. Clearly 
perceived and easily available environmental cues are important, since deficiencies 
in processing environmental information under time pressure and stress may have a 
crucial effect on spatial way finding. 
 
Incompatibility linked around perception covers distraction and overload. This means 
being forced to necessary actions but having one’s range of options limited it is liable 
to cause a negative reaction (Kaplan, 1983). Overall, negative information have 
placed greater weight and time pressure in an emergency, lowering the mental ca-
pacity of processing information and decision-making. However, the rate of infor-
mation processing can also increase if the information provided during an emergency 
serves its purpose (Ozel, 2001). Further, it has been suggested that a low level of 
stress sustains a relatively high judgement performance, but consequently while the 
stress levels increase, a person's judgement performance decreases, because the 
effort to control the process increases (Choo, 1999).   
 
All the same, the person-environment fit theory would suggest that individuals who 
have a poor fit with their environment may be more likely to experience stress (Sher-
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ry, 1991). When time pressure and stress felt in the situation decrease individual’s 
range of cue utilisation to such level that it reduces functioning effectively in the envi-
ronment, such reduction may become problem (Ozel, 2001). 
3.5 Panic behavior in emergency 
 
 
Psychological theories propose that panic is caused by a catastrophic misinterpreta-
tion of perception. A common agreement for the meaning of panic is missing. Thus, 
the conception considers panic an antithesis of organised group activities (Quarantel-
li, 1954). Such behaviour arises from individuals' feelings of isolation in a crisis, as 
well as sensation of collective powerlessness. Almost any kind of collective disorderly 
activity or an individual’s acute fear reaction marked by loss is defined as panic. Re-
gardless of the absence of distinctive criteria for panic, a little assistance to charac-
terise panic is given by such general terms as irrational, antisocial, non-functional, 
impulsive or inappropriate instances of behaviour (figure 10).  Similarly, as with the 
meaning of panic, there is also disagreement on the conditions which produce or fa-
cilitate panic. The presence of panic includes a various set of events, usually a situa-
tion which has a reference to a threat such as crowd and crisis, a lack or loss of 
leadership or a shattering of group bonds (Quarantelli, 1954).  
Flight is a distinctive feature of panic and most frequently takes a form of actual phys-
ical running. In these threatening situations, there is no overt attempt to deal directly 
with the danger itself, rather attempting to escape from the danger. Furthermore, at-
tention is never directed to the past, the focus is kept on what might happen. A pan-
icking person sees the potential threat immediately and survival may depend on a 
very rapid reaction. Contrary to what one might assume, fleeing while panic-stricken 
is not done randomly: People maintain a general orientation for flight from danger 
(Quarantelli, 1954). The two factors in particular that are involved in determining the 
direction of flight are the habitual patterns and interaction among individuals. For ex-
ample in fire, the danger may lie between the presumed safety and a perilous object, 
thus making the endangered person take a direction towards the danger, or ignoring 
a less frequently used door closer by in favour of a often used but more distant exit. 
Interaction among individuals is also involved in the decision making. This interac-
tional factor, however, has only operational and functional sense, because only the 
physical setting can present actual alternatives for choosing the direction of flight. 
Furthermore, panic has also nonsocial and non rational features.  
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Figure 10 Model of panic 
A panicking situation involving no unity of action and no co-operation with others, 
highlights individual behaviour and thus breaks down concerted behaviour.  Some-
times, in a controlled withdrawal people may run around confused with partially dis-
organised activities included in their pattern of behaviour, but the whole structure 
does not collapse as it does in total panicking situation. In such cases panic causes 
even the strongest of primary group ties to shatter, discarding the most expected be-
havioural patterns (Quarantelli,1954). 
However, not all panic is collective. People in panic know they are afraid for what 
usually is their own physical safety, but they are also aware what they are afraid of. 
This experience is never an obscure reaction, rather, an individual's fear is something 
very specific and personal which is never unknown. In this respect, defining the panic 
situation people need to see the threat and associate it in a definite place (Quarantel-
li, 1954).  From a cognitive perspective, people in panic become highly self-centred. 
Subjectively it means processing the information how to get oneself away from dan-
ger. When focus is highly concentrated on saving oneself, it also means orientation 
of activities. Through information processing a person tries to create a sufficient 
awareness of the circumstances. A person in panic neither acts completely instinctu-
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ally nor is totally unaware of anything else. People are at least partly aware of the 
presence of other people. However, the decisions and activities in the situation seem 
rational to the person, one's actions appear to be appropriate to the situation as one 
perceives it at that time. Thus, a fleeing person does not take into account the con-
sequences of their activities that sometimes may lead to an even more dangerous  
situation than the original threat itself (Quarantelli, 1954). Panic in an already threat-
ening  situation causes further danger. The feeling that accelerates the occurrence 
and continuance of panic is entrapment without possibility to escape. The experience 
of entrapment does not necessarily have to do with physical obstacles, but can also 
be of psychological nature.  
To summarise panic behaviour, it can be defined as an acute, individual fear with the 
loss of self-control. Panic behaviour is not random or totally irrational. On the contra-
ry, it is followed by nonsocial and nonrational rules of flight behaviour. People in pan-
ic always have a target for their fear which is present in the situation and causes im-
mediate and strong physical threat. Social consequences become irrelevant even to 
consider: the process of escaping  is self-centred, where no consideration for alterna-
tive choices are made and interactional patterns are ancillary, even breaking social 
norms. 
For summarizing, human behaviour and its relations to social and spatial environ-
ments are investigated in many different research scales. Human is assumed to be 
an active ”actor” in the environment, whose behaviour is affected by stimuli from the 
external environment. The way a human processes and interprets information result-
ing in a psychological response is further transmitted in the decision and action. The-
se processes can be disturbed by several factors from the external environment or by 
the individual's emotions, which may decrease the quality of human-environment in-
teraction and reduce human behaviour. Environment should have a supportive role in 
human-environment interaction when a human is directing attention towards a specif-
ic goal. However, physical science models do not take into account the variety of lev-
els in human perception, information and decision-making processes. Knowledge 
about human cognitive behaviour is likely to increase the level of designed environ-
ments that support proper functioning of human behavioural processes. 
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4 Methodology 
 
4.1 Qualitative approach in technical study 
 
The nature of qualitative research is very human orientated and concepts are identi-
fied in as well as constructed from data. Research process differs from the rigid and 
structured format of quantitive method. Data analysis in qualitative approach deter-
mines meanings of an event or situation and embeds them within a larger context. 
The objective of data analysis is to understand and describe phenomena which are 
studied. For comparison, quantitative approach to literature uses elements of empiri-
cal data which is characterised in a numerical form, such as statistics and probabili-
ties. For that reason it is sensible to use the method when mathematical modelling or 
other measurements are testing variables of data across several repetitions for clas-
sification and analysis purposes. In this perspective, quantitative method generates 
results from a larger sample of population and considers phenomena, theories or hy-
potheses in a more generalised manner (Forman and Damschroder, 2008).  
 
The sources of problems in a qualitative research do not differ from quantitative one. 
Problems are derived for example from technical or nontechnical data or could 
emerge from the research itself (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). In this study, technical 
literature provided initial questions and concept as well as generated new ideas of 
theoretical sampling. Nontechnical literature, however, was used as primary data and 
act as the foundation for developing the model. Researcher has to be careful as to 
what role technical literature play. It can hinder creativity if it is allowed to stand be-
tween the researcher and the data. But on the other hand, if it is used for compara-
tive purposes, it can foster identification of properties and dimension of relevant con-
cept (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).  
 
Researchers face subjective challenges when choosing to do qualitative research. A 
positive challenge and perhaps the most interesting one is the possibility to step be-
yond the known and get at the inner experience of participants. Seeing the situation 
from the  participants' perspective and making discoveries that will contribute to the 
development of empirical knowledge can be very fruitful choice to researcher. Fur-
thermore, subjectivity sometimes allows to suggest that a new approach is needed to 
solve an old problem even though it has been well studied in the past (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008). Evacuation analysis is studied extensively in the maritime domain. 
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The gap between simulated evacuation performance and reality does exist. A new 
perspective is needed when there are difficulties to apply existing methods or there is 
little opportunity to tune the evacuation model. In this particular study, a refreshing 
approach to the process of data collection and the analysis is applied. 
 
There are also pitfalls where researcher, if not careful, can fall into.  Researchers al-
ways bring their own knowledge and perspectives into the research. This is called 
sensitivity and it has an important role in qualitative research. By means of sensitivity 
researcher is moved along in the analysis and with the help of personal knowledge 
and experience the researcher is able to pick up relevancies from the data. However, 
strong subjectivity involved in data analysis should be avoided because in qualitative 
research, objectivity is not dependent on the researcher’s judgement of an event or 
situation (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).  
4.2 Introduction to qualitative analysis 
 
Content analysis is a family of systematic techniques used to analyse characteristics 
of language as communication with attention to the content or contextual meaning of 
the text (Hsiu and Shannon 2005; Forman and Damschroder, 2008). It is known as a 
method of analysing documents. Furthermore, it may be used in a inductive or a de-
ductive way. Sometimes, both ways can be applied at the same time. Which of these 
ways is used depends on the objectives of the study. Inductive analysis is based on 
empirical evidence while deductive approach is derived from logic.  Discrepancy be-
tween inductive and deductive approach is that in inductive process the facts ac-
quired through observations lead theories and assumption while deductive study via 
logical reasoning theories or hypotheses are either accepted or rejected.  
 
Inductive approach is elected when knowledge about the phenomenon is fragmented 
and data is originated from a small sample of observations. In that case, qualitative 
analysis process can be divided into phases as follows; preparation, organising and 
finally reporting (Elo and Kyngäs, 2007). In the preparation phase, attention must be 
paid to the unit of analysis. The sample must be representative of universe from 
which is it drawn  (Elo and Kyngäs, 2007). It is necessary to construct units carefully. 
A unit of meaning can be constructed from more than one sentence with several 
meanings. Using this type as a unit of analysis, it may make analysis process difficult 
and challenging. On the other hand, if unit of analysis consists of for example a word, 
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letter or one sentence, there is a risk of fragmentation. The most suitable unit of 
analysis is a whole interview or observational protocol which are large enough to be 
considered as a whole and small enough to keep in mind as a context of meaning 
units during the analysis process (Elo and Kyngäs, 2007). Researchers must also 
decide whether to analyse a latent content or manifest from data. If choosing to also 
find out hidden meanings from textual data, analysing those usually involves interpre-
tation (Elo and Kyngäs, 2007). 
 
Next in the analytical process, researchers strive to make a sense of the data. This 
means tying up elements available from the research data for creating an accessible 
understanding of what is sought from the data (Elo and Kyngäs, 2007; Zeisel 2006). 
The aim is to immerse in the data, read it through several times. Without becoming 
entirely familiar with the sense of the data, no insights or theories can spring up from 
it. In the inductive approach of content analysis process, the data is organised by an 
open coding system. The notes, headings and descriptive aspects of contents are 
written down while reading through data. After this, categories are grouped under 
higher order headings (Elo and Kyngäs, 2007; Hsiu and Shannon 2005). The pur-
pose of creating categories like this is to provide a means of describing the phenom-
enon but also to increase the understanding and generate knowledge.  However, or-
ganising data to categories is not only to aggregate the observations, instead, when 
data is classified to a particular group this implies a comparison between data and 
other observations that do not belong the same category (Elo and Kyngäs, 2007). 
Finally, the results are described according to the contents of the categories. A suc-
cessfully performed content analysis requires categories that reflect with the subject 
of study in a reliable manner.  
4.3 Discovering themes for data collection 
 
This section contains definition and introduces themes and explanations relevant to 
this research connecting theories from literature review and current evacuation mod-
eling to achieve the theses goal. 
Before coding data from accident reports collection of themes must be constructed. 
The themes described have been decided upon the literature reviews including hu-
man behaviour which has value in theoretical orientation but also evacuation plan-
ning in maritime field. When combining these two literature reviews, it will give a 
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widespread entity, which allows to step beyond what is the current situation of model-
ling. Themes describe the characteristics of the studied problem and phenomena. 
Data will be organised into four main themes under context of passenger ship envi-
ronment and population.  
 
Main themes are; (1) Source of stimuli, (2) Human behaviour, (3) Spatial environment 
and (4) Social environment. Categories have been structured under each of these 
themes and further codes shared with similar characteristic have been set into cate-
gories. 
 
First theme (1) source of stimuli consists of stimuli from external environment and 
personal internal emotion. One of the most crucial influences are the sources of in-
formation that must be considered when making choices. Emotions are included un-
der the theme, because how people feel affect actions they make. Thus, categories 
under this theme are important to recognise, since behavior is based on stimulus 
characteristics. 
 
Second theme (2) Human behaviour consisting of elements of passengers' cognitive 
abilities have been divided into subcategories by means of the circle of cognitive pro-
cesses. Current evacuation analysis does not focus on simulating actual emergen-
cies, but rather assess the performance of ship in certain benchmarked scenarios 
(IMO, 2007). Therefore, guidelines do not consider human cognitive processes in the 
analysis. This leads to a problem of understanding the human cognitive process, in-
volving factors such as risk perception, interpretation of emergency and actions. In 
addition, the limitation of information processing especially under stress restricts the 
accuracy of decisions made by individuals. In actual evacuation human cognitive 
processes affect on physical behavior, in other words, walking speed, usage escape 
routes and ultimately performance of ship in an emergency. 
 
Third theme includes the ship’s (3) spatial environment which focuses on spaces 
where passengers have been located and objects they have used or paid attention to 
or used during the evacuation. Furthermore, key areas of action highlight spaces 
where most of specific activities happened during the evacuation. In the guideline, 
geometrical element considers schematization of escape routes by using hydraulic 
network. Identification of inadequate escape routes, congestion points optimization of 
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evacuation arrangement are carried out by theoretical and mathematical point of 
view. For the purposes of this study, however, spatial environment is considered 
through human-environment relationship as referenced in the literature review. 
 
Fourth theme characterises (4) social environment. This theme is related to the effect 
of other people on one’s behaviour; forming of crowds, the importance of group ties 
(support or indifference towards others), panic of few escalating to a more extensive 
chaos, irrational behaviour, etc.  
 
The figure 11 represents the current passive evacuation modelling, in which the hu-
man cognitive process is ignored and the external stimuli leads straight to action. The 
proposed model in the figure 12 is based on the themes, describing the information 
processing from external and internal stimuli through human cognitive process to de-
cision making and action. These two tables can be considered a framework for the 
themes and a basis for the analysis.  
 
 
Figure 11 Current evacuation model 
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Figure 12 Proposed model according to themes 
 
 
5. Analysis 
 
5.1 Fundamentals of marine casualty investigation 
 
IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee adopted the Casualty Investigation Code providing 
a common provision for the Flag States to conduct marine safety investigations into 
marine casualties and marine incidents (MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.2). The code aims to 
prevent marine casualties and similar incidents from happening in the future. Specify-
ing mandatory requirements and considering the variations in International and Na-
tional laws related to investigation of marine casualties, it provides a framework to 
the States approving the code. The Flag States and Coastal States under the IMO’s 
umbrella but also the shipping industry generally benefits from increased objectivity 
in jurisdiction and decreased differences in investigation standards.(A 20/Res.849, 
1997).   
 
Statutory investigation of marine casualties is dictated by the IMO Code. It clearly in-
structs the responsibilities and cooperation policies for the Flag State involved. It also 
considers casualties occurring in territorial waters, inland waters as well as on the 
high seas and exclusive economic zone of State. In addition, the United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS 94th article defines the extended legal 
duties to Flag States, including marine casualty investigation.  It states the following; 
”Each State shall cause an inquiry to be held by or before a suitably qualified person 
or persons into every marine casualty or incident of navigation on the high seas in-
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volving a ship flying its flag and causing loss of life or serious injury to nationals of 
another State or serious damage to ships or installations of another State or to the 
marine environment” (UNCLOS, article 94.§7).  
 
The code provides procedure and instruments for collecting evidence, identifying and 
analysing the causal factors of casualty but also making recommendations for safety 
improvements. The scope of maritime safety investigations should look beyond im-
mediate causes and improvements should be made throughout the whole chain of 
responsibilities.  
 
Europe has its own supervising authority EMSA (European Maritime Safety Agency) 
which works in cooperation with the EU commission and the Members States aiming 
to harmonise the way accident investigations are carried out in the European Union. 
The agency also maintains a database of serious marine casualties in Europe in or-
der to facilitate accessible sharing of knowledge from past accidents. EMSA has 
been a very useful source while collecting data: At the moment there is no world wide 
database available and for that reason accident reporting is fragmented to amid Flag 
States authorities only without any obligation to notify ship accidents internationally if 
they happen in territorial waters. This considerably complicates data collection. 
5.2 Data collection for analysis 
 
 
When carrying out a safety analysis, it is fundamental to obtain a reliable data 
source. Also, to fulfil reliability data must fit together with the research problem and 
analysis objectives. Maritime accident report offers a source for quantitative and 
qualitative safety analysis. Accident statistics are often used as a source for quantita-
tive risk analysis to determine probabilities of accident occurrence and identification 
of consequences of risks. Depending on the perspective and the user, statistical data 
has relevant and crucial value. Among shipping community as well as among re-
searchers accident failure data is often used as a source because it represents a 
large amount ships. For example, classification societies' aims are directed towards 
compliance of rules in accident cases. On the other hand, for shipping companies 
and the insurance viewpoint is the economies of scale. For this study, accident data 
represent unique and authentic information from accidents occurred mostly from the 
passenger's point of view. In this approach accident statistics data has been moved 
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aside and interests have been directed towards people’s environmental behaviour 
under an emergency. Studying behaviour in a physical environment eventually gen-
erates data about people's activities in certain situations (Zeisel, 2006).  Investigation 
reporting has mainly focused on elements of technical or human factors causing a 
marine accident. Even though those factors need to be identified properly, it is equal-
ly important to understand the passengers' behaviour and actions under an emer-
gency situation. 
 
In qualitative research there are many alternative sources of data. Researcher can 
use nontechnical literature such as interviews, drawings, field observations or like in 
this study, documents and reports including memoirs. Reports from ship accidents 
are obtained from primary and secondary sources as follows; investigation bureaus 
around Europe such as National Maritime Accident Investigation Bureaus (The Finn-
ish safety investigation authority SIA and The Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
UK, MAIB) and The European Maritime Safety Agency, EMSA represent primary 
sources.  Secondary sources, represent ”lesson learned”-reviews collected from pub-
lic sources (internet sites).  
 
The quality of analysis depends on the quality of material sources one is analysing. 
This is connected to theoretical sampling, a method of cumulative data collection 
based on concepts derived from data. In some way, the differences between qualita-
tive and quantitative methods involve trade-off between breadth and depth (Pat-
ton,1990). Qualitative approach permits inquiry into selected issues in a great depth 
with attention to detail and nuance. Qualitative data collection does not need to be 
constrained by predetermined analytic concepts the way that quantitative data is 
structured. However, breadth versus depth varies also depending on the strategic 
choices in qualitative design process. A specific set of experiences for a large num-
ber of people seeks breadth as a more open range of experiences for a smaller 
number of people seeks depth. Qualitative inquiry typically focuses in depth on a rel-
atively small sample size, but there are no specific rules. Sometimes even a single 
case, selected purposefully is acceptable. Sampling strategy has a meaningful role, it 
must fit the purpose of the study, the resources available and the question being 
asked, among other things (Patton, 1990). As there are only a few critical cases to be 
studied, it does not allow broad generalisations rather produce a strong weight of ev-
idence.  
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5.3 Accident report definition 
 
The most valuable issue when choosing the case studies for analysis was the variety 
of maritime accidents and the circumstances present during the accidents. All of the 
factors considered - such as the ship type, classification of the accident, event type 
and circumstances - had a specific influence on the interaction between human be-
haviour and the ship environment. The variety in cases is beneficial because it gives 
a change to study differences in human behaviour when circumstances vary.  
 
Ship accident reports used in this theses represent different classifications of mari-
time accidents. According to the IMO, maritime accidents can be divided into three 
categories based on their consequences; Very serious, serious and ”other acci-
dents.” The range of accidents analysed in the theses fall in all categories from very 
serious accident to ”other accidents”. Maritime accident of MV Estonia is defined as 
very serious and C/S Costa Concordia as serious accident by consequences of hu-
man lives lost and the total loss of the ship. MS Sally Albatross in turn, falls into the 
category of ”other accidents” since the consequences of the accident were limited to 
economic losses.  
 
Even though only flooding is represented in the event types, the cases are neverthe-
less used for comparison. The reason why only flooding is included as an event is 
caused by the lack of accurate and detailed qualitative data available on human be-
haviour during a fire in ship accidents. In addition, both ship types, cruise and RORO 
ships are represented in the case studies. The time of day and weather conditions 
also have an effect on accidents. Thus the duration of time is considered in the cho-
sen accidents, along with weather conditions which vary from stormy to calm weath-
er.   
5.4 Case study: MV Estonia 
 
MV Estonia departed in the 27th of September from Tallinn for a scheduled voyage 
to Stockholm, Sweden carrying officially 989 passengers and crew members alto-
gether. The voyage proceeded normally at first, the sea conditions were moderate 
but became more rough as Estonia proceeded from the shelter of archipelago to 
open sea. Because of the wind conditions pitching and rolling increased. At 0100 hrs 
the ship heeled suddenly to starboard. According to many testimonies during the fol-
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lowing ten minutes between 0105 hrs and 0115 hrs many passengers as well as 
crew members heard unusual, loud noises from the bow area. At 0115 hrs the bow 
visor separated from the bow and large amounts of water flowed on the car deck. 
Because of progressive flooding the ship listed very rapidly to starboard. The first 
mayday call was received at 01.22 and another mayday was sent from Estonia at 
0124 hrs. At this time the heeling angle was approximately 40-45 degrees and the 
water level reached up to accommodation deck. As a consequence of rapid flooding 
at a considerable speed the starboard side of the ship was submerged and the ship 
sank as stern trim about 0130 hrs. Estonia disappeared from radar at 0150 hrs. 852 
people lost their lives (JAIC). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 MV Estonia itinerary  
 
At an early phase of the accident at 0045 hrs most of the passengers were in their 
staterooms.  Some passengers stated that rough sea caused sea sickness and they 
were not able to sleep due to ship motions such as pitching and rolling. According to 
testimonies, the first perception due to noises and motions of the ship appeared to be 
strong indicators that everything was not as it should be. Many passengers, particu-
larly those on the lower deck draw attention to unusual, loud noises. It caused exten-
sive worry and unsafe feeling among the passengers. On the 1st deck, accommoda-
tion units were located on the front side of midship. Passengers from this location 
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heard strong metallic noises coming from the bow area and responded more careful-
ly. In one testimony a female passenger heard loud thumping and clacking. She 
thought it was strange and talked about it with a friend. She got scared and left the 
stateroom (JAIC p. 68). Later on she sat on the 7th deck while major blow was heard 
and the ship started to list. This happened approximately 10 minutes later (JAIC 
p.77). However, passengers on the upper decks reacted slower compared to the 
passengers whose staterooms were located on lower decks. Noises caused reaction 
among the passengers on public areas, A group of passengers opined comments 
such as the ship colliding on an iceberg, but most of the passengers paid no attention 
to the noises at first. One passenger wanted to the Pub Admiral on 6th deck after 
hearing a loud crack but others told this particular passenger to stay and wait (JAIC 
p.74). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Simulated time line of MV Estonia 
Evacuation time was approximately only 10-20 minutes. This is based on testimonies 
and composed a simulated timeline of the accident shown in figure 14 (HSVA, JAIC). 
During 0100-0122 hrs first 2-3 blows came from the bow with scraping noises though 
the ship’s hull caused by the bow visor which detached from attachments. Immedi-
ately after, the ship suddenly started to turn port and heeled starboard very quickly. 
At the beginning of the evacuation, the key areas of action were at staterooms. List-
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ing woke many passengers in their staterooms because pieces of furniture and other 
loose objects slid towards bulkheads. At this phase, passengers reacted and tried to 
look for a way out from the staterooms and to upper decks. From staterooms pas-
sengers moved into corridors, but it was rather difficult to proceed, because of drastic 
listing and open staterooms' doors. Passengers had no organised way to act in these 
circumstances. People were screaming and rushing around in corridors (JAIC p.70). 
At Cafe Neptune's people sat completely still, apparently frozen and terrified (JAIC 
p.72). Passenger reactions were characterised by confusion and disbelief about what 
was happening. 
Listing caused immediate panic among people and they were running around (JAIC 
p. 74). During the evacuation bottlenecks are indicated at open spaces (e.g. the lob-
by, in front of staircases) and staircases. Listing affected drastically the movement of 
population in  staircases. Frozen people clogging the exit to upper decks prevented 
access from ascending passengers, thus forming crowds in the staircases. Further-
more, when number of people tried to use guardrails at same time, with effect of list-
ing, eventually forces directed to rails increased too high, thus guardrails pulled 
away. According to several testimonies, movement at staircase with heeling angle 20 
degrees or more was extremely hard and people had to struggle to move upper 
wards. Relatively soon climbing became simply impossible (JAIC).  
At large open spaces proceeding was difficult because of listing, moving property and 
slippery floors. Injured and fallen people complicated movement through open spac-
es on the way towards the main staircases. Main lobby is a wide open space. Listing 
of the ship made movement really difficult. Staircases were situated at midship, on 
central line of the ship and it was very difficult to reach them (JAIC p. 70).  
Way finding happened more likely intuitively. On the 4th deck accommodation units 
were located in two sections, one at the fore and another at midships. The main lob-
by and staircases to upper decks situated between the units.  At fore two transversal 
staircases on both sides of ship lead on the 7th deck. In contrast, at stern there was 
only one staircase to upper decks. One female passenger came out of a stateroom 
located at midship, near the lobby and the main staircase. She moved towards the 
stern, fell down inside a stateroom through an open doorway. She managed to pull 
herself out and continue proceeding in the listing corridor (JAIC p.72). However, the 
nearest escape route located near her stateroom, in the main lobby (figure 15). There 
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are many similar testimonies which indicate way finding to be more likely intuitive 
than steered by cues from the environment. There were no strong indicators suggest-
ing people would have been trying to search for an alternative exit route - they likely 
did not have that chance because of the situation. 
 
 
Figure 15 4th deck layout of MV Estonia (JAIC, 1994) 
5.5 Case study: C/s Costa Concordia 
 
C/s Costa Concordia was on its weekly cruise in the Mediterranean Sea carrying al-
together 4229 passengers and crew members onboard when the ship departed on 
13 of January 2012 at 1918 hrs from the port of Civitavecchia (Tyrrhenian sea, Italian 
coastline) with intention to continue to the port of Savonia (Italy) - destination which 
was never reached. The weather conditions in the area were favourable.  At 21.39  
hrs the ship is still on course as planned, heading towards ”Punta Capo Mario”. Im-
mediately after, at 21.40 hrs the Master of Costa Concordia gives orders to change 
the course against initial navigation plan and the ship starts to approach the island of 
Giglio. As a consequence to that course of action, the ship is sailing too close to the 
coastline. Master of the ship causes true hazard to the ship and the people onboard 
when passing the Island of Giglio at an unsafe distance.  At 2145 hrs the ship sud-
denly collides with the ”Scole Rocks” at the Giglio Island and immediately heels vio-
lently and the speed decreases. The ship loses its propulsion and the rudder remains 
completely blocked on starboard and no long works. The accident happens during 
dinnertime onboard, thus many passengers hear the crashing noises.  At 2154 hrs 
crew member announces to the passengers a blackout onboard (Full accident report 
of Costa Concordia). According to a testimony, at this point it was informed that the 
blackout was caused by a technical failure and that the situation was under control 
(Lesson learned review, p.39). 
 
 
 46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 C/s Costa Concordia itinerary 
 
At 2230 hrs, 45 minutes after the collision some passengers start to proceed towards 
lifeboats, even though neither general nor abandon ship alarms have been given. At 
2235 hrs the abandon ship alarm is given and at the same time it is announced that 
passengers should proceed to the muster stations and the first lifeboats are dropped. 
At 2300 hrs the ship grounded at the Giglio Island on starboard side has a heeling 
angle of 15 degrees at this point. The ship continues heeling during the evacuation 
and at 2314 the heeling angle is more than 40 degrees. At 2400 hrs passengers dis-
embark from the ship starboard side using boarding ladders, since the heeling angle 
is too high for dropping off any more lifeboats. At 0617 the rescue operation of Costa 
Concordia is completed. Total of 32 people lost their lives and 153 were reported 
having injuries. (Full accident report of Costa Concordia).  
 
At the time of accident, it was the busiest time of day onboard with the passengers 
having dinner or otherwise enjoying the evening activities. In a restaurant located on 
the third deck, an American couple had just started their dinner when they witnessed 
a violent  shaking of the ship followed by long crashing noises as the plates and 
glasses were breaking due to listing of the ship towards starboard (Lesson learned 
review, p.38). Similarly, a cruise passenger in the ship's theatre witnessed the ship 
colliding on the rocks, the ship shuddered and scraped against something solid (Les-
son learned review, p.33). Still, most passengers reacted quite slowly to the situation 
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and the crew members continued their work as if nothing had happened. Without 
waiting I stood up, and held my wife’s hand and told her firmly, we are out of here. As 
we raced out the back door of the theatre, I noticed that 99 percent of people had not 
even stood up (Lesson learned review, p.33).  
 
In this early phase of the accident, reactions involved for some passengers a thought 
of having a lifejacket from the staterooms where jackets were normally held. A fe-
male passenger exclaimed to his husband a second after the collision We need to 
get our life jackets! (Lesson learned review, p.33). In another testimony people at the 
dining hall were having similar thoughts, About 30 minutes into the situation we are in 
the dining room when my husband decides it's time for us to go and get at least our 
lifejackets from the room, because at this point we have no idea if we do not go back 
to our room where else can we get our life jackets from (Lesson learned review, 
p.38). Furthermore, the sound of the alarm was not clear for all passengers. I at that 
moment asked the room attendant where are we supposed to go, and she replied in 
a very irritated tone, saying, ‘‘Madam, at this point there is no emergency. You do not 
need to go anywhere. Please stay here and wait for further instructions and for the 
emergency alarm to sound,’’ which we had no idea how it would sound like (Lesson 
learned review, p.39). This was likely caused by the fact that there were no safety 
drills after departing from ports, thus the passengers were not aware about the pro-
cedure in the case of an emergency (Full accident report of Costa Concordia). Be-
cause Costa had this ability to sell a cruises embarking from many ports, in a con-
stant circle, it is unknown to me when of if they performed a proper muster drill, stat-
ed a testimony by a male passenger (Lesson learned review, p.34).  
 
Moving inside the ship was hard from the beginning. In the large open spaces pieces 
of furniture had shifted due to listing causing a danger. In addition, water flow and 
darkness made moving across the ship more difficult. While passengers cross the 
ship from port to lower starboard side for the rescue, proceeding was difficult I felt 
like the ship was in  around 35 degrees tilt by now and it was very wet and very diffi-
cult to move about (Lesson learned review, p.35).  
Furthermore, it required physical strength to climb the staircases, since the ship was 
tilted and there was only emergency light guiding the passengers at staircases. 
Staterooms had no lighting, it was pure darkness and shifted furnitures complicated 
getting lifejackets out of the closets. Somehow we did manage to get to our room 
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holding the guardrails, very much exhausted and now panicked, stated passengers 
when they managed to find their way in the stateroom for lifejacket (Lesson learned 
review, p.38). Since people were proceeding to the assembly stations before any 
alarm had sounded, passengers mostly gathered in staircases, located near to life-
boats but some of the passengers sat outside the staterooms waiting for something 
to happen. Crowds formed in these areas. Furthermore, because of uncertainty and 
long waiting time, People started to panic and felt frustrated as the ship was listing 
more by the minute (Lesson learned review, p.40). Some passengers started to little 
by little move closer to the lifeboats. We were getting frustrated, aggravated, and the 
crowd was pushing and shoving against each other, still no sign of any emergency 
alarms or any evacuation instructions from the captain. Finally the lifeboat crew let us 
on as they saw the crowd getting enraged and out of control. There was no order in 
boarding the lifeboat, and everyone was shoving, pushing, and kicking to get onto the 
lifeboat (Lesson learned review, p.40). 
 
After the alarm had sounded, passengers started pushing each other in the crowd 
while at same time the crew was in a hurry to launch the boats as fast as they possi-
bly could at the state where heeling angle reached 20 degrees. ”Until this point I saw 
relatively little rude pushing from a small number of various people during the entire 
crisis... but only until the  boats were deemed full...Now it began to get less courte-
ous, more people wanted to push on (Lesson learned review, p.35). 
 
The situation was completely unclear for the passengers the whole time. It is evident 
that no real-time or reliable information was available by the Master or crew. This de-
layed the  passengers' ability to process information for their decisions. In this re-
spect the passengers had to make their own judgments about the situation, trusting 
their own perceptions. People asked each other about the situation and trusted more 
in third part information than the crew. Communication between the crew and pas-
sengers was  nonexistent. A male passenger described the crew's behaviour during 
the emergency saying One hour from the rocks, still the same story. No boats were 
launched on this side of the ship (starboard). No action by the crew. I felt again like 
the crew is now going to kill us (Lesson learned review, p.34).  
 
Same announcement was repeated during the emergency about electrical failure and 
that the situation was under control, Everything is under control. It is an electrical 
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problem. We heard that too often in the two hours (Lesson learned review, p.33). Be-
fore abandoning the ship the alarm sounded at 2235, some of the crew members had 
ordered passengers to move back into their rooms to wait for instructions. This may 
have been in order to avoid panic among the passengers but the crew's behaviour 
was absolutely inappropriate for the situation. 
 
 
 
Figure 17 Illustration of accident of C/s Costa Concordia 
5.6 Case study: Ms Sally Albatross 
 
Ms Sally Albatross departed on the 4 of march 1994 at 1104 from Tallinn, Estonia for 
a scheduled voyage to Helsinki, Finland carrying officially altogether 1202 passen-
gers and crew members. The voyage proceeded normally until the Finnish coastline. 
Because of compressed ice initial navigation plan had to be changed during the voy-
age. Ice cover was 15-25 centimetres thick in the Gulf of Finland and there was 
packed ice along some parts according to the forecast from that day. Otherwise 
weather conditions were good. Near Porkkala, 54 miles from Helsinki at 1438 hrs the 
ship collided for the reason of a navigational error with ”Savin ice buoy” and contin-
ued over the shallows. The ship had a slight grounding with ”Savin” Shallows, which 
in its lowest is 4,6 meters while the ship's draft in the aft was 5,88 meters and in the 
fore 5,62 meters. The ship turned in the starboard side and heeled 2-3 degrees. After 
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the collision situation remained stable for a while. The damage control procedures 
were started with an order by the master immediately.  At 1608 hrs the Master of Sal-
ly Albatross ordered evacuation alarm. The crew started an orderly evacuation of 
passengers from the first deck, proceeding to upper decks. At 1613 hrs the evacua-
tion order was implemented for abandoning the ship. At this point the heeling angle 
was at 6 degrees on starboard side and the ship had subsided 1,22 meters from orig-
inal draft. Passengers were rescued to Navy ships, the ice breaker URHO and to a 
passenger ship on scene. At 1700 hrs the heeling angle reached 10 degrees and the 
Master ordered the crew to abandon the ship. Rescue operation was completed at 
1800 hrs when the Master finally abandoned the ship.  All passengers and crew 
members were rescued successfully with no casualties (Full accident report of Sally 
Albatross).  
Since Sally Albatross was the ship transporting people and cargo in scheduled voy-
ages between Tallinn and Helsinki, at the time of accident, the ship was nearly ap-
proaching Helsinki. Passengers spend their time at the ship mostly in public places 
during the journey. However, according the report there is no evidence that passen-
gers onboard noticed the collision with the ice buoy. (Sally albatross accident report).  
In the early stages of the accident at 1515 hrs, passengers were informed about the 
situation. This information included a short description of the accident. It was a clear 
announcement ordered by the Master. Still, the information did not reach all of the 
passengers,  and therefore it was repeated several times to ensure everybody was 
aware of the situation. (Sally albatross accident report, p. 29). Passengers had a high 
awareness about the situation all the time, because information from the crew was 
clear and in addition the crew guided passengers to the assembly stations. No pan-
icky behaviour patterns, irrationality or crowding was perceived. It was stated that 
passengers behaved mostly in a calm manner. Furthermore, the passengers did not 
question the situation and crew behaviour during the evacuation. However, some mi-
nor disturbance was perceived as, according to the report, during the evacuation of 
the restaurant some male passenger wanted finish their dinner, but eventually 
obeyed the order from the crew without major difficulties (Sally albatross accident re-
port, p. 34). 
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Figure 18 Ms Sally Albatross heeling angle at 1700 hrs  
 
Problems in the evacuation were connected to the staterooms corridors. Some pas-
sengers became distressed when they were unable to open watertight doors. Also 
the lighting conditions were indicated to be good, even emergency lighting gave light. 
However, daylight facilitated the situation and in this sense any major difficulties to 
proceed inside the ship were not indicated in the report. (Sally albatross accident re-
port).  
Passengers were rescued from the aft. Evacuation was conducted in an orderly fash-
ion by the crew. Most of the passengers were assembled from the main restaurant. 
During the evacuation lifejackets were not handed out to passengers. One passenger 
asked for a lifejacket for her daughter, but the crew told the passenger that it was not 
necessary because distributing lifejackets would only cause panic. (Sally albatross 
accident report p. 36). 
5.7 Context definition of analysed data 
 
There are four main themes in which the data is systematically categorised. In the 
first phase of the analysis, data was coded to enable processing and organising on a 
conceptual level in order to facilitate the analysis. The purpose is to distinguish key 
information related to human-environment interaction in the evacuation situation from 
each of the reports separately. 
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In the second phase, propositional definitions of the categories were developed and 
then compared with each other to detect possible relationships. Since human behav-
iour is the core theme to which other themes are linked, the outcome proposition is 
based on their combination.  
 
In the final phase, analysis outcomes are compared with existing theories and 
knowledge on human behaviour in an emergency, emergency research from other 
fields associated to high-risks, as well as with established rules of evacuation analy-
sis.  
 
Contents of the themes and their relations are presented as follows: 
 
Theme 1: Source of stimuli 
 
Category: External stimuli and emotions: Passengers share matters related to exter-
nal environment stimuli, for example loud noises, violent shaking of the ship, listing or 
the received information from the crew whose quality varied between accidents. In 
addition, passengers experienced emotions such as fear, anger and panic during the 
evacuation process which were linked either to the external stimuli and as such func-
tioned as motivation for response. Source of stimuli linked to human perception and 
information processes.  
 
Theme 2: Human behavior 
 
Category: Perception, information processing, decision-making and activities: Source 
of stimuli is related to the way passengers understand a situation and how they inter-
pret incoming information in order to give a suitable response to situation or problem. 
Furthermore, decision-making is a thought process of selecting a logical choice from 
the alternatives available. However, stimuli, time pressure or emotions interfere the 
process of information and decision-making and the level of activities conducted dur-
ing evacuations vary from rational to irrational.  
 
Theme 3: Spatial environment 
 
Category spaces and objects: Spaces represent key areas of action, in which main 
activities happen during the evacuation. Objects such as guard rails are used for fa-
cilitating movement inside, life jackets in turn increase the physical safety and emer-
gency lighting serve as guidance for passengers in the way finding situation. Envi-
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ronmental cues are directly linked to human activities, how well potential action is 
made possible by a given object or environment.  
 
Theme 4: Social environment 
 
Social contacts among the passengers and connection between groups involve fea-
tures which are linked to group ties, group information spreading or for instance, how 
passengers behave towards one other in an emergency situation. Social environment 
is linked to the circle of human behaviour. 
 
Table 19 Mv Estonia coding framework 
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Table 20 C/s Costa Concordia coding framework 
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Table 21 Ms Sally Albatross coding framework 
 
 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1 Human response to environmental stimuli in an accident  
 
Passengers actively perceive their environment and sense external stimuli such as 
environmental conditions, ship motions, noises and other passengers in order to un-
derstand the situation. In some cases, pre-warning came from external stimuli to alert 
passengers of danger before the accident itself even occurred. In these cases, stimu-
lus was a clear motivation and strong enough for response and further trigger action. 
However, not all passengers perceive the signs of danger and receive warning visu-
ally, audibly or physically from other passengers behaviour. According to the analy-
sis, the quality and amount of stimuli might impair passenger information processing 
and interpretation of the situation. Furthermore, responding to dangers seem to be 
dependent upon the location of a passenger but is also situational. In extreme cases, 
those passengers who felt or saw the danger responded accordingly and thus had 
better chances of surviving the accident. Incompleteness of information and time 
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pressure are likely to affect understanding the situation comprehensively, and further 
leads to misinterpretations and inappropriate actions, also delaying individual activi-
ties.  
Usually, stimuli which comes externally to the person causes stress when it is linked 
to the demand of some response or change in behaviour. Thus it is linked to the con-
dition of the environment (Choo, 1995). These three factors are linked together in the 
decision-making theories. Under time pressure negative information or incomplete 
information reduces judgement and decreases decision-making these situations 
(Ozel, 2001). Furthermore, physical threat in an emergency is considerably high, and 
constrains people to make decisions quickly. Time in this respect has the tendency to 
create stress and the level of stress to increase. More attention is redirected from 
judgement and the capacity of making decisions is lowered (Choo, 1995).  In this re-
spect information has a direct impact on the degree of stress and the amount of time 
pressure people experience (Ozel, 2001).   
However, the studies investigated show the importance of understanding the human 
cognitive processes under an emergency. Nevertheless, no studies have paid atten-
tion on passengers cognitive abilities during an emergency in the maritime field. This 
might stem from the general premise to assume that the crew's ability to provide in-
formation and guide passengers is enough to conduct evacuation efficiently, which is 
not always the case. 
According to the accidents investigated the process of evacuation follows three dif-
ferent procedures resulting in differences in passengers' behaviour and survival from 
accident; (1) Early stage alarm and crew guidance, (2) delayed alarm, without crew 
guidance and (3) no alarm sounds after the accident nor guiding. These two latter 
cases vary significantly from standard evacuation (first case) and from the passen-
gers' perspective, affect their behaviour during the accident, for instance reducing 
their performance.  For future proposals concerning people's behaviour and perfor-
mance, the two latter cases should be empirically tested in a safe environment, such 
as virtual reality in order to gain a full understanding in respect of time consumed in 
evacuation and also to identify different behaviour pattens among passengers. 
There are fundamental differences between onboard trials and real accidents. In this 
chapter the response time and experiment design are reflected through psychological 
sciences. The first issue is related to the flow of evacuation. Sea trials obey the pro-
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cedure of evacuation determined in the guideline evacuation analysis MSC 1238. To 
subdivide the process in phases, the evacuation begins with alarm sound, which in 
passengers' perspective means listening to the instructions given by the crew, follow-
ing the guidance to assembly station and further rescue. However, according to the 
accidents investigated in this study, the evacuation is not always conducted this par-
ticular way. In addition to the process described above the evacuation is followed by 
two other procedures, where early alert and clear instruction to passengers were 
missing or delayed alarm and inadequate information complicated the evacuation.  
In reality people are perceptive of their environment and that means the evacuation 
in fact starts before the alarm sounding. Thus, the time pre-warning has a significant 
meaning in the process of evacuation especially in the situation where the alarm is 
delayed. In operational sense, this seems to define the direction of evacuation pro-
cess and highlight the importance of relevant and efficient information with properly 
timed alarm announcement. Comparing real accidents to trials, in the case of Sally 
Albatross, ideal procedures were followed and the evacuation process happened 
similarly as onboard trials. Precise and efficient information, as well as having real 
time information available the whole time prevented irrational behaviour among the 
passengers. However, on Costa Concordia and Estonia relevant information was 
missing and therefore the passengers had no way of making correct judgements in 
order to decide the right course of actions, thus behaving in a way that seemed inap-
propriate for the situation.  
Another issue is related to data collection. The purpose of sea trial experiments is to 
collect time data for further analysis (Galea et al.,2011, 2013). The manner in which 
the experiment is designed and conducted has an effect on the results. The 
measures of response time of passengers focused on response time per se. The 
time itself is directly meaningful. This means that the response time measures have 
only statistical significance. Response time data was presented as a distribution, with 
an emphasis on the mean values.  
Response time has value in physiological sense, because it has direct effect on in-
fomation-processing of human being. In psychological field, the goal of response time 
measurements is to understand basic human psychological processes (Pachella, 
1973). Response time can be most typically defined as an interval between presenta-
tion of the stimulus to a subject and subject response (Pachella, 1973). Trials were 
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conducted semi-announced, meaning that experiments were generated on a basis of 
implicit instruction, assuming that people are then trying to minimise their response 
time.  
According to Pachella (1973), in these situations a person waits for the stimulus to be 
presented in order to response in a correct manner neither rushing nor delaying the 
response.  Thus, the response time is taken to be the minimum time needed to pro-
duce a correct response.  
Sea trial experiments had little value in psychological sense, since subjective re-
sponses were not examined and further analysed. These kind of experiments tend to 
ignore artefacts due to information processing of a person, because it only measures 
time and assumes that people behave more or less similarly to one another. This 
does not correspond with findings from accident reports, where people's information 
processing had a significant role caused by variations in the evacuation procedures 
and errors in information processing due to incomplete information. Furthermore, in 
statistical sense this type data collecting attempts to skew response time distribution 
positively, because it presents a mean response time value, hence cutting possible 
errors out of scope (Pachella, 1973). 
However, experiments were recorded by using the video footage method. This could 
be useful also in empirical studies, when collecting data about people's information 
processing resulting to response in the various evacuation procedures. In this res-
pect, the response time measures have substantial meaning - it is necessary to un-
derstand people's  behaviour in order to succeed efficiently in the evacuation pro-
cess.  
6.2 Way finding under an emergency 
 
Way finding of passengers in the evacuation happens rather intuitively or nonrational-
ly than by obeying the procedures of rational way finding. However, there were no 
clear indications of individuals' subjective way finding process in detail, for instance 
how signage assisted passengers in the situation, or if sign visibility was provided 
easily for perception purposes.  
However, way finding is goal oriented, since a person's intentions are focused on 
reaching the destination. General flow of way finding can be described through the 
cognitive process. During the process, humans develop an understanding through 
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their senses of the existing world and interrelate it with stored spatial knowledge. 
Creating a cognitive map to plan activities transfers decisions into physical activities 
(Chen and Stanney, 1999). In this respect way finding emphasises efficiency of the 
environment to provide spatial information, since accuracy of information can influ-
ence the way finding performance (Tang et al., 2009).  
The case studies emphasised factors such as the absence of guiding, incomplete in-
formation, time pressure causing stress and panicking which were likely to reduce 
the quality of information processing and decision making and thus influenced way 
finding behaviour. Way finding was considered through these factors. However, peo-
ple experience these factors differently and the way finding process may be strongly 
affected by personal experiences and environmental factors which may result in dif-
ferent spatial cues collected and used by individuals (Chen and Stanney, 1999).  
Furthermore, it is expected that the crew guide the passengers to assembly stations 
and provide real-time information during the evacuation. Guiding especially facilitates 
passengers' way finding from their position to assembly station and also likely affects 
positively to decision-making, because provided information helps understanding for 
instance, which specific route should a person take in order to arrive in the desired 
assembly station safely. This highlights the core role of the crew to control situation 
as a whole. In the case studies there was clear evidence that information given in the 
evacuation situation along with the presence of crew guidance improved the efficien-
cy of the evacuation conducted.  
6.3 Social environment and panic 
 
According to findings from the analysis, panic is associated with ship motion and ar-
chitecture. In the investigated cases panic was situational, mostly triggered when 
people tried to escape from immediate danger in a situation that at times was ex-
treme. These situations were dependent upon ship listing as well as architecture af-
fected to movement of a person. For instance, the staircases and large open spaces 
caused danger to passengers, due to complications to the continuity of movement. In 
these situations people tend to use every effort they possibly have in spite of having 
to continue movement through the danger, in order to escape. The effort continues 
as long as a person sees a real chance to flee and survive (Shaw, 2001). Further-
more, during the escape passengers did not use the nearest escape route which 
would have been the first choice for escaping from danger and trying to get to safety.  
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The ability to act rationally is linked to the physical context of the emergency evacua-
tion but also to the nature of the situation (Aquirre, 2005). Escaping from danger is 
dependent upon the degree of threat and motivation of an individual (Aguirre, 2005). 
Furthermore, under the threat people’s desire to get way from danger is so high, that 
decision of way finding or escape direction are not always logical. People are tempt-
ed to use routes that are known or frequently used by them rather than use those 
closer by (Quaratelli,1954). 
Usually, in literature panic behaviour is described through the activities (e.g. Aguirre, 
2005; Quarantelli,1954; Shaw, 2001). However, in contrast, some passengers in the 
same situation while others escaped, just sat paralysed without ability to mobilise 
themselves. However, there is similar evidence from the aviation field, where pas-
sengers sat immobile after emergency landing. This behavioural inaction is related to 
denial of an accident (Shaw, 2001). On the other hand, some disaster researchers 
emphasise that when people are totally trapped, they are not panicking at all and no 
course of action is taken, because there is no hope of getting away from the danger 
(Quarantelli, 2001). 
Traditionally, panic has been described through the behaviour of an individual. How-
ever, panic does have features of social interaction and highly collective behaviour. 
Aquirre (2005, p. 122) claims that after decades of panic research, it is now assumed 
that panic is social and affiliate behaviour in the situations when the risk of death or 
injury is high, as opposed to Quaratelli (1954) who manifested panic to be asocial 
collective behaviour. In the study cases it was found that crowds formed in the as-
sembly points and staircases.  
According to the findings, people fought and shoved each other for places in lifeboat. 
This might be due to a threat to physical safety when evacuation is delayed. Even 
though it is rare that people take physical contact to each other, excluding extreme 
crowd disasters, situations can get out of control due to spontaneous behaviour in 
response to the perceived threat (Beverley, 2005). Instead, any collective mass panic 
or flight was not found and more over, mass panic, where people are trampled over 
by others is relatively rare (Beveley, 2005; Quaratelli, 2001;).  Also no mass egress 
from a closed space was reported, it is nevertheless likely that such situations did 
and will occur. 
 61 
One of factors that causes panic, is the lack of leadership and moreover, inadequate 
leadership skills. Similarly to maritime accidents, it was stated in an empirical study 
on air passengers' perception about the safety that the flight-crew leadership is im-
portant for controlling panic (Chang et al., 2008, p. 1465). According to the findings, 
typical causes and consequences were incomplete information, prolonged waiting 
time and inability to make decisions leading to situations where ”third party infor-
mation” became a significant source of information guiding people. However, even in 
the worst circumstances, there is a place for natural leaders to take charge, if profes-
sional leadership is on an unsatisfactory level or does not exist at all. This kind of in-
formal system is called, according to Beverley, (2005) ”emergency organisation” 
which rapidly develops among those affected. Natural leaders arise in such circum-
stances with efficient response, helping others to survive (Beverley 2005). 
 
In the light of evidence collected from the studies, prolonged waiting affected pas-
sengers in a way that they gathered for instance in staircases waiting to be rescued. 
People have tendency to gather in large places in group context (Aquirre, 2005). In 
case of sudden changes in circumstances, e.g. flooding, increased listing or fire 
spreading, it may result in uncontrolled panic. In such circumstances, having people 
already blocking the escape routes for themselves by gathering in staircases, the sit-
uation is hazardous. Staircases as a safety feature are important escape routes to 
assembly stations. According to (Ahola et al., 2014) studying passengers' safety per-
ception onboard expressed concern over staircases being trammeled in the evacua-
tion. When developing regulations in the future, it is necessary to consider in opera-
tional as well as in functional sense, how this affects the passengers.  
 
The term ”panic” was widely used in data at least as diversity relating meaning of 
panic.  Panic was characterised as aimless, irrelevant movement, yelling, pushing 
and rushing or paralysing behaviour. Perhaps, the usage of the term stems from eve-
ryday speech to describe irrational behaviour with groundless fear in a threatening 
situation. Further, in the crisis situation basically any irrational behaviour is called 
panic, and thus widespread diversity of panic can have multiple meanings and condi-
tions that generates the phenomenon (Quarantellli, 2001). 
In the future the definition of panic should be sharpened to avoid any misuse of the 
term. Irrational or aimless behaviour are not such patterns of behaviour that meet re-
quirements of the definition. Still more detailed knowledge is needed on people's  
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(passengers) behaviour to define the occurrence of panic or stress due to an acci-
dent.  Proceeding on a more detailed level, focus should be directed to questions of 
emotion, information processing and judgements, as well as activities during an acci-
dent. Consequently, those issues are important to understand in order to prevent pa-
nicky behaviour among the passengers.  
6.4 Ship architecture in an emergency 
 
Based on the analysis, large open places became dangerous while the ship was list-
ing and the lack of safety appliances (such as guardrails) in these particular spaces 
complicated the proceeding across the space. In addition, due to listing the staircase 
handrails pulled away by extreme use and forces. In terms of safety, architecture and 
safety appliances have a significant meaning since the environment's purpose is also 
to guide passengers, facilitate their activities and ensure their safety in the evacua-
tion. For instance, guardrails have significant and very practical value for passengers. 
Passengers ranked guardrails as the most important safety feature in the ship (Ahola 
et al., 2014). Estonia accident highlighted some architectural factors although those 
improvements in the regulations were more technical. However, it can be considered 
that enforcing the lower section of bulkheads in corridor segments in order to have 
possibility to continue walking even if the ship is listing benefits the passengers. Fur-
thermore, escape routes must be kept free during the voyage. Amendments of regu-
lations were approved in 1997 in SOLAS 1974, II-2/28-1 (JAIC). However, the usabil-
ity of guardrails was not under consideration at that time, even if it has crucial role for 
survival of an individual. 
 
Lifejackets that were used in the Estonia accident by passengers were refused to be 
distributed by the crew during the evacuation. Although improper, this can be consid-
ered an isolated case. Failure of complying the rules is ineffective and dangerous in 
terms of safety. Safety appliances around the ship are the most visible factors to 
passengers and  therefore, the condition and functionality should be reliable but their 
availability is of an equally high importance. Easy access to the safety appliances 
evokes a feeling of security in passengers (Ahola et al. 2014). Furthermore, it reduc-
es the probability of unnecessary injuries or even casualties in the rescue phase, if 
passengers wear life jackets.  
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In evacuation analysis, escape planning complies with the model which does not 
consider passengers passing through a large space (IMO, 2007). For instance, mod-
els propose escape routes from large space (restaurant) to stairs and further to as-
sembly points in the daytime cases. However, according to evidence it is quite usual 
that the passengers' movement is directed through public areas, such as lobbies or 
restaurants when, for  instance, moving across the ship from one side to the other. 
Even if from the design perspective it is not considerably natural, efficient or a de-
sired choice to design a escape passages through large spaces, it is likely that pas-
sengers in the ship evacuation do  proceed through them in order to get to the as-
sembly station.  
 
The latest guideline for evacuation, Safe Return to Port suggests that ”the ship is the 
best lifeboat.” The work for updating safety regulations of passenger ships started 
already in 2000. The cruise industry expressed their concern regarding controlled 
evacuation of large amounts of passengers, especially concerning the difficulties 
faced with evacuating passengers with disabilities (Germanishe Lloyds). However, 
there are perspectives that highlight keeping people onboard for as long as possible. 
According to the operational perspective of Savolainen (2015), to prevent unneces-
sary casualties or injuries due to ship motion in rescue state at sea, the best practice 
is to hold passengers in safe circumstances onboard, and assembling them to large 
open spaces for easier and more effective control.  
 
In accordance to (SRtP) regulation 21.5.1.1 functional requirements are presented 
for safe areas to passengers. It determines that safe areas are preferably to be ar-
ranged in the accommodation spaces or public places. Furthermore, sizing of these 
safe areas should be based on the time needed for safe return to port operation 
(Germanishe Lloyds p. 25). However, selection of areas for safe areas may be based 
on scenario type and environmental conditions. In operational sense, it can then be 
assumed that safe areas may have to be established in public places, for instance in 
case of spreading fire in accommodation area.  
 
Large open spaces surely have to be safety critical in the sense that fire and water 
spread more easily in these spaces (Ahola et al., 2014).  In such case, if the scenario 
is escalating quickly e.g. with increasing heeling angle, flooding or smoke and toxic 
fumes spread fast through open spaces, likely causing the crowd to panic. This situa-
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tion highlights crowdmanagement which has to be very efficient and escape routes 
should be kept untrammelled.  
6.5 Accident investigation 
 
The main objective of maritime accident investigation is to prevent accidents from 
happening similarly in the future. Investigation relays on international regulation 
adopted in MSC-MEPC.3/Circ.2. Investigations focus mainly on finding causes and 
consequences of accidents from a technical perspective. Therefore many improve-
ments in ship safety concern technical system safety rather than comprehensively 
distinguishing multidisciplinary aspects. Describing the approach to investigation as a 
top-down process, only recently has the focus been directed towards organisation 
behaviour, when after the  Costa accident attention was paid to crew members' ac-
tivities, training and safety culture. However, not much attention has been paid to the 
passengers' survival from an accident. This observation is supported by the fact that 
accident reports where passenger pertain to as an integrated part of investigation is 
rather limited.  However, not all implementation and follow-up of recommendations as 
part of the investigation concern only technical safety improvements. For instance, 
the crew neglecting safety drills arose in discussion after the Costa Concordia acci-
dent. Requirement for musters for newly embarked passengers prior to departure en-
tered into force in 2015, three years after the accident (amendments: SOLAS regula-
tion III/19). The highlight the necessity to learn from past accidents, It would be con-
venient to study how these changes actually affect passengers' perception of safety.  
 
All accident reports examined for this study included either hearing passengers as 
witnesses or interviewing them by surveys afterwards to collect evidence to support 
in analysing causes and consequences of the accident. Yet passengers' perception, 
activities interaction with environment and each other or emotions are in subordinate 
role in the investigation. Thus, the behaviour of passengers during the emergency 
are very little known. Formal accident investigation might not be enough to prevent 
accidents from happening similarly in the future. Hence, Lesson Learned is the 
knowledge or understanding acquired by real experiences. In fields where risks are 
high, such as the military, learning from the past failures or successes has become a 
significant framework for collecting, storing or disseminating and reusing experi-
mental knowledge (Weber et al., 2001). Rather than provide recommendation it of-
fers guidance through the different levels of organisation (Weber, et al., 2001). Le 
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Coze, (2013) stated that learning from accidents  is still young and scattered in high-
risk industries. Furthermore, he recommended using cross-disciplinary perspective 
as a method.  In other words, combining psychological, sociological or managerial 
sciences in empirical studies is a way to increase the level of knowledge and learning 
from accidents (Le Coze, 2013).    
 
Also in maritime field, the reason for limited amount of research data available from 
real accident in the passenger perspective is related to the inability to integrate multi-
ple dimensions of disciplines. This considers knowledge on individual and social lev-
els, which seems to have an important role in accidents but is yet missing from inves-
tigations. The best practice in order to learn from the accident is to focus on real life 
incidents. By using different methods, such as post-analysis from real accidents with 
integrating multiple perspectives such as social and psychological sciences into re-
search throughout the organisational levels increases understanding on what really 
happens during accidents and which factors, for instance, actually reduce the effi-
ciency of evacuation performance. Furthermore, post-analysis from accident is the 
only way to collect real accident data and gain insight to people's behaviour during 
an emergency, thus being an opportunity which should not be missed.   
 
7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
7.1 Overview of research outcomes 
 
Research revealed that in emergency (1) people trust more in their own perceptions 
and intuition than given instructions by the crew. (2) Human behavior is guided by 
instinctual urge to get away from the danger, while rational thinking needed in way 
finding is secondary. (3) Furthermore, if there’s a lack in safety instructions people 
tend to follow each others, which often results in crowding in places that should be 
untrammeled in order to ensure efficient evacuation. (4) Accident investigation should 
be integrating multidisciplinary perspective for increasing understanding about pas-
sengers’ behavior during an accident. Evacuation analysis is in need of a tool with 
which to study findings such as these that are closely linked to human behaviour. 
The following chapter proposes a solution for a more flexible and comprehensive re-
search tool. 
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7.2 Recommendation for Virtual reality as a research tool  
 
 
This section proposes an idea of using virtual reality as a research method for inter-
action of passengers and the environment and collecting data from human behaviour 
in order to develop evacuation analysis towards reality.  
Virtual reality (VR) is a technology which claims to provide the "ultimate" interface be-
tween humans and computerised applications based on real-time, three-dimensional 
graphical worlds. To clarify the elements of Virtual reality (VR) or virtual environment, 
the term ”virtual” means a technique in which a specific world is imaginary. ”Reality” 
in turn enables a person to enter into that specific world experiencing it as if it was 
real. There are several advantages in using simulation and game in illustrating inter-
connected processes within complex systems. It offers a possibility to create a logical 
system that provides realism and enables rapid responses to user inputs. 
Simulation and game environments focus learning not simply on the knowing of facts 
and ideas (Jackson, 2004). Utilisation of game development industry principles, pro-
cesses and techniques for creating and training environment for analysis, prediction 
modelling, evaluations and education enables new forms of knowledge interaction 
previously unavailable within the normal curricula. Game's virtual reality and envi-
ronment visualisation becomes a dynamic and active process experimentation and 
experience.  
Virtual reality has been applied in several domains: surgical simulations in medicine, 
sports, entertainment, military, built environments, economics and transportation. 
Engineering and social sciences have successfully utilised virtual reality in improving 
safety issues, learning processes and design architecture. 
For example, the military has historically used virtual environments and simulation in 
"war games" as far back as the 1950s in order to improve high-risk occupational 
training. The virtual war teaches the soldiers to prepare for a real combat situation. It 
teaches ways to deal with unexpected events when it is vitally important for them to 
understand how to react in dangerous settings where any decision might mean the 
difference between life and death. It develops an understanding on how to behave in 
and deal with unexpected events. As virtual reality is used as a safe training tool for 
soldiers, it also provides teachers and researchers with immediate responses and 
data on human behaviour. Safety issues in military and in the naval domain have this 
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in common: the need for information on human behaviour and action, decision mak-
ing process as well as perception in an unexpected situation.  
It is possible to use the game as a research tool, instead of only focusing on using 
the game for learning purposes. In general, design scientists produce and apply local 
knowledge for unique circumstances to create effective artefacts. Design science is 
made up of constructing artefacts for special purposes and for assessing their effect 
under well-defined circumstances of use (Klabbers, 2006). A basic question that 
needs to be addressed is how well does the artefact perform, considering the specifi-
cations for the design, including the goals to be achieved? Problem settings point out 
that design science is issue driven. It addresses human needs, conquers bottlenecks 
and capitalises on opportunities. Implementing games in social systems to raise the 
level of awareness, to practice skills and also to produce knowledge, are interven-
tions to enhance change (Noy et al., 2006). 
Virtual reality is used in maritime domain for training the crew, for instance for pur-
poses of ship navigation. Operational perspective supports developing training effort 
and educational performance as well as complex operation management (Buzzing, 
2013). In addition, several software tools simulating human behaviour in emergency 
situations in maritime domain use virtual environment as a platform. However, in or-
der to test current theories and models of human information processing, decision-
making, interaction with environment as well as emotional models VR could be used 
to elaborate and extend knowledge (Noy et al., 2006). Problem structure and prob-
lem-solving processes can be investigated, interpreted and further applied for design 
purposes, even regulative processes. Simulation and game environment enables 
new forms by swinging interaction from passive to active which means an active 
learning process (Jackson, 2004). Learning is a comprehensive experience since a 
person in virtual reality is immersed within an environment, concept or a system. Fur-
thermore, in virtual reality the process can be either sped up to view longitudinal out-
comes or slowed down for incremental progression. Longitudinal outcome means the 
natural course of life or disorder in which a group of subjects are observed over a pe-
riod of time and is especially beneficial when studying the risk factors of human life. 
Since time and place can be manipulated in virtual reality it is a suitable research tool 
for analysing already occurred accidents, thus gaining advance in lesson learned 
possibilities because the environment and events can be manipulated safely (Jack-
son, 2004).  
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Human as an active operator needs to be set on the premise, unlike current agent-
based modelling which does not highlight user participation. Some argue that the VR 
is only seen as a framework for maintaining traditional practices and still ignores hu-
man factors and cognitive processes as perceptual issues (Johnson et al., 2010). 
Comprehensive use of virtual reality for investigating human behaviour in non-
emergency and emergency situations is missing. However, many studies (Jackson, 
2004; Klabbers, 2006, Noy et al., 2006) in multiple fields have investigated the usage 
of virtual reality and found that VR is an effective empirical research framework con-
sidering human perception and cognition. The doubts regarding whether the results 
of human perception and action in virtual reality can be applied and transferred in 
natural environment is probably justified. However, this particular question concerns 
also other investigated topics such as learning and training. For instance, is training 
effective in virtual environment? Further, is the first officer ready to navigate a ship 
after being trained just within a virtual ship? Gaining the best outcome, training both 
in natural and virtual environment brings the best benefits. Similarly, for research 
purposes, at least some of the experiments would be conducted in a natural envi-
ronment and when a consistency is reached in the results, it will be verified for by 
both environments (Van Veen et al., 1998).  
Theses outcomes have put weight on the importance of understanding human cogni-
tive behaviour in purpose-driven ship environment. Individual’s way finding in com-
plex environment, social environment in emergency or external environmental cir-
cumstances surely are affecting human behaviour and effective answers for these 
complex environmental issues are still being sought. Maybe physical modelling in 
some of these challenges affecting human mental behaviour which is then reflected 
on the physical behaviour cannot be solved by traditional design manners or in field 
experiments.  
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Figure 22 Propositional virtual reality framework 
 
Figure 22 illustrates the outline recommendation as a framework for investigating 
human cognitive processes in virtual reality in emergency or non-emergency situa-
tion. Humans are set at the centre of the framework, because passengers work as 
active users conducting goal oriented tasks. Similarly, as in reality, humans are inter-
acting with the environment and the human goal oriented mindset makes decisions 
and actions for proceeding towards a final goal.  
Virtual reality here is functioning as a interface tool enabling humans to conduct dif-
ferent tasks. Virtual reality is online spaces functioning as a replica of physical ship 
spaces and as an extension of the ship environment. Interaction does not happen 
merely between the environment and the user, but VR enables also constructing so-
cial dimensions. Even though the user would sit alone in front of a computer, a social 
environment can be exposed with different levels of social interaction either with oth-
er players or with game agents (Noy et al., 2006). Social theories are dependent up-
on the field and the objectives of a research. For instance, group presence in an 
evacuation where passengers make decisions and judgments are not solely related 
to individual behaviour (Noy et al., 2006). Thus, it is worth testing how information 
influences a group's decision-making and activities (movement). Individuals have lim-
ited attention to the world which they perceive and interpret at once resulting in a sit-
uation in which our expectations and knowledge overrule the information that is actu-
ally available from the stimulus (Jackson, 2004). Even though human perception has 
cognitive limitations due to culture, past experiences and interpretations of the per-
ceived space or objects, humans still do actively perceive their environment instead 
of just taking ”snapshots” of the environment, since they are driven by an individual’s 
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desire to arrive at precise decisions. Therefore, VR provides a technology of rich vis-
ualisations which is balanced with realism (Johnson, et al, 2010). Furthermore, in vir-
tual reality a precise control over the present stimulus is possible. In addition, VR 
technology enables users to navigate in the virtual environment, manipulate objects 
and get feedback from the environment. For testing purposes it is possible to record 
time and measure distances needed in design or for evaluation purposes. 
In technology, virtual reality is used in the design process to enable engineers to view 
artefacts in 3D and gain a greater understanding on how systems work. This also 
helps them spot any flaws or potential risks before implementation. Design team can 
observe their work within a safe environment and make changes if necessary. Taking 
advantage of these capabilities virtual reality offer in identifying human actions in 
evacuation process seems very reasonable.  
Following hypotheses have been made:  
Advantages of using virtual reality game in a ship environment:  
- Examine the ways in which passengers perceive the environment around them and 
how these perceptions are utilised in information processing and decision making.  
- Widen the understanding of human behaviour in stressful situations, such as evac-
uation, and provide valuable and more detailed data for improving usability issues 
and promoting safety.  
The basic idea of the serious game in passenger ship environment is simple. In "Vir-
tual Reality Ship" game, the players move around the ship as cruise passengers ex-
ecuting various specific tasks. For example, the player would have to navigate from a 
cabin on the 7th deck to the nearest assembly point on the 8th deck. This task could 
be completed in various situations - under normal conditions, in case of a fire, while 
the ship is flooding, or any number of other instabilities. Human behaviour in stressful 
situations may change radically from one scenario to other.  
Virtual reality can be built based on ideas, facts, qualitative and quantitative research 
data. Creating a virtual ship should be based on reality, in order to get results that are 
representative and valid in practice. Visualisation of the environment is generated 
from an existing ship structure and architecture in detail. Subjective perspective of a 
passenger should be used as a basis and utilise data from personal safety issues of 
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cruise passengers: which artefacts do people consider safe and which are the issues 
they have concerns about. Age and gender of passengers must be identified in order 
to generate an authentic population. The users' individual tasks in the game are 
based on the scenarios defined in IMO guidelines in passenger ship evacuation, but 
can be adapted to be more detailed. Using data from previous microscopic simula-
tions available from naval domain, flow rates, flow densities, walking speed, time us-
age in ship evacuation process gives physical basis for human behaviour. For closing 
this chapter, figure 23 summarises the main benefits, challenges and opportunities of 
virtual reality. 
 
Figure 23 Summary of pros and cons of virtual reality 
7.3 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this theses was to study human-environment interaction during evac-
uation from the passengers' perspective. The results from the study give us insight to 
human behaviour affecting the evacuation process, which can be used to develop 
evacuation analysis that is more corresponding to reality. However, rather than 
providing detailed information about human behaviour in all its aspects, the theses 
emphasises certain factors in human behaviour which are crucial for surviving from 
accident and that is why further study questions are proposed. Current evacuation 
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modelling does not take these factors into account. Human behaviour studies in 
evacuation situations focus primarily on improving and validating existing evacuation 
models in respect of human physical abilities, mainly excluding psychological aspects 
out of scope.    
 
More reliable data on passengers behaviour in this respect need to be collected. 
Thus, proposals of using virtual reality as a research tool in multidisciplinary perspec-
tive are provided here. It would benefit engineers in design, the classification society 
and ship owners. 
 
In conclusion, a future study could examine how and which factors influence a per-
son's ability to make good decisions during an emergency on a more detailed level. 
The concepts of time pressure, information flow, stress and panic are necessary to 
include in the context of human-environment research in maritime accidents. Learn-
ing more how passenger perceive and act in ship environment in an emergency in-
creases safety in the evacuation and enables to improve knowledge towards reality.  
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